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Growing Interest in Security and Privacy
Privacy and security are emerging as two vital issues and,
as a result, these two topics are appearing in a growing number
of computer related discussions (Conway, et. al. , 1972). This
current interest was not always the case for, up until the last
decade, these issues were of minimal concern and only informa
tion which was vital for national security was deemed relevant
for protection purposes (Martin, 1970) (Feistel, et. al. , 1971).
The advent of computer systems awakened the commercial, private,
and legal sectors to the problem of ensuring privacy and securi
ty (Dinardo , 1978). Due to the increasing use of computers as
a means of providing cheap and efficient communications plus
their ability to process tremendous amounts of sensitive infor
mation, coupled with the vulnerability of these systems
and
their data files to penetration, the need for privacy and secu
rity within computer systems became increasingly apparent
(Ko-
lata, 1977). Thus, the culmunation of legislative and societal
pressures combined with technological innovations resulted in
the current interest in computer security and privacy (Burns,
1977)(Konheim, 1978).
Security versus Privacy
Security and privacy are related. Often time discussions
involving these issues lump the two together thereby failing
to distinguish their differences. As a result, privacy and
security are frequently confused with one another (Davida,
1978).
Privacy encompasses not only the legal and ethical issues
of data collection, but the moral ones as well. It safeguards
the individual's right to control the collection, dissemination,
and use of all personal information. In contrast, the technical
means of controlling access to, modification, and dissemination
of, data is dealt with by security which ensures the enforcement
of all privacy decisions (Conway, et. al. , 1972).
Environmental Threats
Sensitive information stored within the computer network is
highly vulnerable to disclosure thus making the task of data
privacy and security extremely difficult (Sykes, 1976).
Data is always susceptible to monitoring, modification,
misrouting, or substitution during its transferral over communi
cation links. But perhaps an even greater and more insidious
danger is the insertion of spurious data designed to confuse or
misdirect the operation of the system (Benedict, 1974). When
ever a storage device such as a disk is used to store sensitive
data, there is always the danger that this information will be
accessed by unauthorized individuals. If the data is stored on
removable media such as disc packs or magnetic tapes, the ad
ditional threat of the physical removal or theft of the infor
mation exists (Sykes, 1976).
If the network is not suitably protected then the perpe
tration of any of these threats can lead to considerable damage
which may result in rendering the network useless for communi
cation purposes and/or the storage of sensitive information
(Popek & Kline, 1979). Consequently, in order to securely pro
tect a network, the failures, errors, omissions, and vulnera-
bilities of that particular network must be considered (Browne,
1977).
Cryptography and Data Protection
The use of cryptography to protect information within the
network is one means by which the privacy, secuz-ity, and integ
rity of information exchange can be safeguarded (Popek & Kline,
1979). Cryptography is both the method and the process through
which communicated and stored data can be protected against theft
or misuse regardless of whether or not the disclosure is legal
or illegal and the attempt is deliberate or accidental. Although
cryptography by itself is not sufficient to protect a system, it
can be used to supplement other data security countermeasures
(Keys & Clamons, 1974).
What is Cryptography?
Cryptography is a highly technical science which deals with
the techniques by which the originator of the information can
transform the message in such a way that it is unintelligible if
intercepted by someone other than the intended receiver (Dinardo(l
1978). It is this transformation of original text or plaintext,
usually on a bit or character level, into meaningless jiimble or
ciphertext which is referred to as encryption (Benedict, 1974).
Decryption is the opposite of encryption and is the reversal of
the transformation process, enabling the unintelligible message
to be reconverted back into meaningful form. Both encryption
and decryption are carried out by means of an algorithm re
ferred to as a cipher system (Katzan, 1977). Associated with
each cipher system is a key or pattern of bits. It is this key
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which is the sole means of determining the transformation used
for the encryption/decryption process (walker & Blake, 1977).
The primary objective of cryptography is to produce com
plex data transformations such that the amount of time and re
sources required to break the ciphertext by far exceeds the
value of the information which is being protected. The "time
factor"
enables the sensitive information to be kept secure long
enough so that it may be out-dated and therefore useless by the
time the intruder finally breaks the cipher. The "cost factor",
on the other hand, results in the intruder paying a higher price
for the information than it is actually worth to him (Hellman,
1979)(Mellen, 1978).
Cryptography in the Past
Cryptography, which literally means "hidden writing", ini
tially evolved as an art and is believed to have developed in
dependently in various ancient civilizations such as Egypt, In
dia, and Mesopotamia (Lempel, 1979). It was not until much
later with the systematization of cryptographic techniques by
the Arabs that cryptography was finally transformed from an art
into a science (Branstad, 1977).
Cryptography in Transition
Throughout history, cryptographic techniques were constant
ly changing as a result of the pursuit for a perfect cipher sys
tem which was impenetrable to cryptanalytic attack. One of the
earliest cryptographic techniques devised replaced each letter
of the plaintext message with one of several substitutes called
homophones. For example, if the homophones for the letter
"e"
were the values 16, 20, 36, or 75, then two possibilities of the
resulting encryption of the word
"secret"
might have appeared as
07 16 27 55 75 99 or 07 20 27 55 36 99. Notice that while the
homophones for the letter
"e"
varied, the substitutions for the
other letters remained constant. Thus encryption of the same
word two or more times within the same message enabled the
cryptanalyst to reduce the homophones to equivalent terms and to|
the eventual cracking of the cipher. This technique, therefore,
was soon discarded since it relied on too obvious a substitution
technique (Kahn, 1966).
It was not until 1466 in Italy that the foundations for
modern cryptography were laid. Leo Battista Alberti devised a
cryptographic technique referred to as polyalphabeticity.
Whereas in previous cipher systems, only a single alphabet was
used to encipher the message, thus the term raonoalphabetic, this)
technique employed several different cipher alphabets or substi-|
tution alphabets which were used periodically to encipher the
message (Diffie & Hellman, 1979). These cipher alphabets were
generated from a single, primary alphabet by varying the start
ing letters of the alphabets in relation to the primary alpha
bet. For example, if the primary alphabet was ABC...XYZ then a
cipher alphabet could be created by starting with the third let-|
ter thus yielding CDEF. . .XYZAB. Each cipher alphabet had as
sociated with it a unique keyletter or starting letter. There
fore, in the preceding example, the keyletter for the cipher
alphabet would be "c" since this letter signified the starting
point of the alphabet (for further examples, please refer to
figure 1). By inserting the keyletters at various intervals in
the cryptogram, Alberti was able to indicate which cipher alpha-j
bet was to be used to encipher the following words (Kahn, 1966)
(Simmons, 1979).
Through the use of numerous cipher alphabets to encipher a
single message, the cipher equivalents for the plaintext letters^
varied thus enabling this method to withstand cryptanalysis more
easily than the previous monoalphabetic methods. Cryptanalysis
was by far more difficult since the intruder had to know which
alphabet was used for each letter in order to decipher the in
formation (Diffie & Hellman, 1979) (Lempel, 1979).
In the years that followed major improvements were made to
this cipher system. However, it was not until 1553 that Gio
vanni Battista Belasco devised an efficient and secure means of
indicating the current cipher alphabet in use. An easily re
membered and interchangeable keyword was repeatedly written
over the letters of the plaintext message. Each letter of the
keyword was then used to designate the cipher alphabet that was
to be used to encipher the corresponding plaintext letter ( see
figure 2).
Although this system remained essentially impregnable over
the next 300 years, it was not widely used. Due to the fact
that this system took some effort to employ and was subject to
error, elaborate homophonic systems which did not require mul
tiple cipher alphabets were used instead. However, with the
invention of the electric telegraph, a flexible cipher system
was needed which would permit prompt error correction. The
ability of polyalphabetic
systems to fulfill this need produced
an increased interest in this type of ciper (Kahn, 1966).
In 1863, Friedrich Kasiski published a method for solving
polyalphabetic ciphers that was based upon repeating keys. The
repetition of a frequent plaintext trigram such as
"ing"
or "thej
in conjunction with the same portion of the repeating key pro
duced equivalent ciphertext. If enough repeated ciphertext was
made available to the cryptanalyst , it was possible to
determine
the length of the key used for encryption and the number of
i
times the key was repeated between repetitions of ciphertext.
The cryptanalyst could then proceed to sort the letters of the
cryptogram into groups based upon key length and subsequently,
analyze each group according to the principles of letter
fre
quency (see figure 3)(Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
The discovery of the vulnerability of polyalphabetic ci
phers spurred interest in the development of more ingenious en
ciphering schemes. One of the outgrowths of this
period was
'the proposal that a single, continuous nonrepeating key, such as
jlthe text of a book, be used in place of repeatedly using a
il
jjsingle word to encipher the plaintext (see figure 4). In spite
i;
iiof the fact that the running key prevented the periodicity
ex-
ij
iploited by the Kasiski solution, this proposal was short lived
ifor Auguste Kerckhoff demonstrated that this cipher system was
no more secure than the previously used polyalphabetic ciphers
(Lempel, 1979). A technique referred to as superimposition
permitted the isolation of two or more identical ciphertext
fragments thereby, indicating that a repeated fragment of the
plaintext message had been enciphered by the same portion of
running key. Given enough ciphertext, the cryptanalyst was able
to obtain sufficient information to solve the cipher (Diffie &
Hellman, 1979). In this way, Kerckhoff's superimposition method
could be used to break any polyalphabetic cipher devised up until
this time (Kahn, 1966) ( Simmons, 1979) (Mellen, 1978).
In the early
1900'
s the discovery was made that only one
cipher could resist the superimposition technique. This cipher
system employed a nonrepeating key which was both meaningless
and without pattern (see figure 5). The key consisted of a
totally random numerical string which was added to the numerical
representation of the plaintext (Feistel, 1973). The security
of this system was dependent upon the key used to encipher the
message being nonreusable and the same length as the message
(Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
Although this "one-time system", as it was called, \^as un
breakable, practical difficulties existed. The extremely long
key which was required resulted in this system being prohibi
tively expensive for most applications (Diffie & Hellman, 1976).
This system was also plagued by key management problems which
resulted from the advance preparation and distribution of the
key. Consequently, the "one-time
system"
was impractical for
universal use (Lempel, 1979).
The failure of the "one-time
system"
as a flexible cipher
system led to the search for alternative cipher systems. Thus
the period from 1917 through World War II witnessed the devel-
i
opment of several types of cryptographic machines which marked
the beginning of a revolutionary new trend (Diffie & Hellman, |
1976).
The rotor machine, first developed by Edward H. Hebem in
1917, was probably one of the best examples of this modern sys-
j
tem. This machine consisted of a hard rubber disk or rotor
t
which contained twenty-six contacts on each side. By randomly j
wiring the twenty-six contacts on one side to the twenty-six
contacts on the other side and through the use of up to eight
rotors which rotated on the same axis, the set of rotors pro
vided an electrical path comparable to a series of cipher alpha-j
bets. By depressing keys on the machine's typewriter keyboard, !
i|
a plaintext letter was transformed into a cipher letter which
was illuminated on the panel. After each letter was enciphered,
one or more of the rotors rotated to a new space thereby, estab
lishing a new electrical path and consequently, substituting a
new cipher alphabet (Kahn, 1966) ( Simmons, 1979).
Another polyalphabetic system called the Hagelin device
was invented in 1934 by Boris C. W. Hagelin. This device con
sisted of a variable toothed gear which was used to drive a ci
pher alphabet through a variable number of places. In compar
ison to the rotor machine, this device was simpler to use and
much cheaper, however, it was not as secure. Despite this
drawback, the Hagelin device was used quite frequently during
the years that followed (Kahn, 1966).
All of the systems discussed so far enciphered only one
letter at a time, thus the term monographic systems. The en
ciphering of two or more letters simultaneously was also pos-
10
sible through the use of polygraphic cipher systems. One of the|
best known polygraphic system was the Playfair Cipher (Katzan,
1977).
The Playfair Cipher was based upon digraphic substitution
which permitted two characters to be enciphered simultaneously
through the use of a 5x5 substitution matrix. The plaintext
message was first divided into groups of two characters. The
occurrence of any double letters within the groups was corrected




thereby, eliminating pairs of identical characters. By
referring to the matrix, each pair of plaintext characters was
transformed into an equivalent ciphertext pair according to the
following rules: 1) if the pair of plaintext letters were in
the same row, then the corresponding ciphertext letters were
found to the immediate right of the plaintext letters, 2) if
the two plaintext characters were in the same column, the
e-
quivalent ciphertext characters were the letters immediately
below the plaintext ones, and 3) if the pair of plaintext char
acters were neither in the same row nor the same column, the
ciphertext equivalent of each character was the letter found at
the intersection of the corresponding row and column, with the
row letter of the first plaintext letter being first (see fig
ure 6) (Katzan, 1977) (Kahn, 1966).
The polygraphic system was by far superior with respect to
security than the monographic system. This system was better
equipped to resist frequency analysis by making available a
greater number of letter pairs as well as disguising the
11
characteristics of the letters. As a result, the task of the
cryptanalyst was made exceedingly difficult (Kahn, 1966) (Sim
mons, 1979) (Katzan, 1977).
Cryptography in the Age of Automation
The discovery that digraphic substitution provided greater
security enhancements naturally led to the assumption that sys
tems which enciphered several letters at a time would offer eveii
greater security measures. Lester S. Hill was responsible for
inventing an algebraic polygraphic system that was capable of
enciphering any number of letters simultaneously (Simmons, 1979]
With his discovery, the seeds of modern algebraic cryptography
were laid (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
Algebraic ciphers transformed letters to numbers by means
of a table look-up operation. Encryption and decryption were
then performed through the use of conventional mathematical
methods (Katzan, 1977). In Hill's system, after the letters
([were converted to numerical values, these numbers were used as
li
variables in a set of simultaneous equations. The cipher's
key consisted of the constants which formed the equations.
Although theoretically no limits were set on the number of let
ters that could be enciphered simultaneously, practical re
strictions limited the encipherment to only a few letters (Sim
mons, 1979) (Katzan, 1977).
Hill's system was never seriously used primarily because
of this system's vulnerability to cryptanalytic attack. De
spite the failure of this system, the theory behind it was val
uable and led to the search for more complex families of trans-
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formations (Diffie & Hellman, 1979). Thus, the years that fol
lowed saw the development of greater sophistication in cipher
systems and witnessed the corresponding growth in complexity
with regard to the simultaneous equations. This implementation
of more ingenious enciphering schemes was directly related to
the invention of the computer. The computer increasingly began
to play a more vital role in the design of highly technical ci
phers and the computational power that became available with the
use of the computer had a significant impact on cryptography
(Lempel, 1979).
Prior to the development of electronic computers, only
simple electromechanical systems existed thus restricting the
type of cryptographic operation which could be performed. The
computer, which did not rely upon the use of gears for its com
puting power, was able to break through these restrictions. As
a consequence, the available computing power increased substan
tially and for the first time, the search for better encryption
methods according to purely cryptographic criteria was made pos.f
sible (Diffie & Hellman, 1976).
The introduction of the digital computer was responsible
not only for increasing the available computing power but also
for permitting a more adequate means of testing the strength of
the cipher system. During the 16th and 17th centuries, mathema
tical arguments were often invoked to verify the strength of
the cryptographic systems. These mathematical methods relied
heavily upon the use of counting methods in order to show that
an astronomical number of possible keys existed for a particu-
13
lar system. As systems whose strength had been so argued were
repeatedly broken, the notion of giving mathematical proofs for
the security of the systems was abandoned. This resulted in
this technique being replaced by certification through cryptan-
alytic assault which tested the ability of the cryptosystem to
withstand attack by a skilled cryptanalyst (Diffie & Hellman,
1976). This approach remained dominant until the availability
of the computer led to the formation of a mathematical theory of
algorithms which permitted an estimate of the computational dif
ficulty involved in cracking the cipher system. The cryptog
rapher was thus able to design various mathematical models and
to employ the computer to determine which of the models was the
most secure (Diffie & Hellman, 1979) (Mellen, 1978).
The introduction of electronic computers profoundly influ
enced cryptography and was responsible for ushering in the
modern age of cryptography. However, only the practice of cryp
tography has been affected by the use of computers, for the
underlying principles of this science have remained unchanged
(Mellen, 1978). Cryptography has gained a valuable ally in the
computer and it is increasingly apparent that the computer it
self may well benefit from this alliance. With the evergrowing
need for security and privacy, digital computers may well find
themselves in need of cryptography (Girsdansky, 1971).
Codes versus Ciphers
Encryption can be achieved in one of two ways - through the
use of ciphers or through the use of codes. All of the systems
described thus far in this paper have used ciphers. Although
14
theoretically, there is little difference between the two, in
practice ciphers and codes are quite distinct (Kahn, 1966).
Ciphers are composed of plaintext letters of constant length
and are usually character oriented or character group oriented.
Encryption is performed by mapping a character, or group of char^
acters, into a character or group of characters. Since ciphers
assign substitute symbols to some given set of alphabetic let
ters, any message can be enciphered by a properly designed ci
pher (Davida, et. al. , 1978). Consequently, a cipher can be
i
used to encrypt any information or message that was never said
before nor was ever anticipated as needing to be stated (Feistel
1973).
Codes, on the other hand, are composed of plaintext letters
of variable length and are not as flexible as ciphers. Unlike
ciphers which ignore linguistic structure, codes are semantic
i
;in nature. They are collections of prearranged substitutions
I
jfor words and phrases (Feistel, et. al. , 1971). The process of
| encryption is accomplished by referring to a preordained table,
i
jusually called a code book, which consists of a list of letters,
jwords, and/or phrases together with the corresponding random
jgroups of numbers or letters called codegroups (Diffie & Hell-
i
iman, 1979). As a result of codes being prearranged substitu
tions, only meanings thought of in advance and which can be
composed from prearranged messages can be used. Therefore the
type of message which may be encoded is severely limited (Da
vida, et. al. , 1978).
Codes are generally not well suited for computer use. Their
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failure to be easily automated and more importantly, the diffi
culty in changing the key, or code book, if the key is compro
mised has resulted in codes not being widely used (Diffie & Hell
man, 1979).
Basic Components of Cryptography
Essentially cryptography consists of only two types of oper
ations: substitution and transposition (Simmons, 1979). The
various enciphering schemes in use today are merely variations
in the complexity of these two operations.
Substitution, which is the most elementary of the two, in
volves the replacement of plaintext characters with other char
acters, numbers, or arbitrary symbols as illustrated below.
CANCEL RENDEVOUS plaintext
XMAXLE PLAQLGBYR ciphertext
In this technique, the various characters comprising the plain
text message retain their position but lose their identity upon
encryption (Katzan, 1977) (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
In contrast to substitution, transposition techniques actu
ally rearrange the characters in the plaintext message. This
results in the characters retaining their identity but losing




Cipher systems which depend upon substitution methods are
much more diverse and more widely used than those systems which
employ transposition techniques. Perhaps the primary reason
16
for their universal appeal is their relative ease of applica
tion (Diffie & Hellman, 1979). Despite their ease in implemen
tation, substitution ciphers offer minimal security enhancements
since they are easily solved by means of frequency analysis.
The cryptanalyst need only make a table listing the frequencies
of the various letters, letter pairs (digrams), and letter
tri-
j
pies (trigrams). Careful study of this table reveals those let
ters which occur quite frequently (the letters
"e"
and "t"), I
those which occur rather infrequently (the letters
"q"
and "z"),
and finally, frequently occurring letter pairs which usually
re
flect the pairing of a vowel with a consonant.
Thus through
frequency analysis, the cryptanalyst is able to identify plain
text letters and their corresponding ciphertext equivalents
(Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
Although substitution ciphers are vulnerable to cryptanalyt-j
ic attack, the size of the
alphabet plays a vital role in the
ease with which the substitution cipher is broken. Too short
an alphabet permits frequency analysis to be easily carried out |
while too long of one introduces other difficulties. If the
alphabet size is increased, the compilation of a frequency
table becomes a tedious task thus making this technique too pro-t
hibitive both with respect to time and expense for the crypt
analyst. Therefore, for substitution
techniques to be relative-t
ly secure the key must be limited to
a reasonable size - one
that is neither too short and therefore vulnerable nor so long
as to introduce compilation problems (Diffie & Hellman, 1979)
(for further information on substitution ciphers see figure 7).
17
Transposition Ciphers
As with substitution ciphers, transposition ciphers are
also1
relatively easy to decipher, however, they are not quite as vul-j
nerable (see figure 8). Frequency analysis of the letter pairs ;




of the word "believe"), thereby allowing the plain
text to be reconstructed through the search for permutations
which rejoin them. This permits the recovery of the key used to
transform the plaintext into ciphertext and subsequently, the
plaintext itself from the cryptogram alone (Diffie & Hellman,
1979). As a result of the letter frequencies in the plaintext
being invariant in cipher form, transposition techniques are \
i
seldom used by themselves due to their vulnerability to crypt- j
analytic attack (Katzan, 1966). !
Applicability for Computer Use
Both transposition and substitution techniques are ideally
suited for cryptographic processing by the computer. These two
techniques can be easily implemented by means of the binary
number system. The use of
"n"
binary digits results in the
generation of
2n
distinct binary codes. Thus a block of 5 bi
nary digits can generate 32 distinct
combinations - more than
adequate to encode the twenty-six letters of the standard alpha
bet. More combinations are made possible by increasing the
size of the digit block (Katzan, 1966).
In addition to the ease with which binary digits can be rep
resented in electronic circuitry, they have all the advantages
of decimal numbers in that they can be added, subtracted,
18
.multiplied, etc. It is this arithmetic manipulation which
plays!'
a vital role in cryptographic techniques designed for the com
puter (Feistel, 1973).
[Message-Oriented Systems
j Substitution and transposition ciphers are applicable for
situations in which only short and transient messages are being
transmitted, since this type of message is characteristic of
inessage-oriented systems, these two ciphers are well adapted
for this type of system (Hsiao & Kerr, 1978).
Information-Oriented Systems
Situations which deal with large databases and long mes
sages require the use of longer keys than are required by mes
sage-oriented systems. Although multiple short keys have been
used to produce a long compounded key, this solution is not al
ways adequate. Situations which require the easy detection of
any errors need a transformation whose ciphertext is rich in
bits and, therefore, sensitive to any change of a single digit
position. Transformations which fulfill these characteristics
provide high message confidentiality plus error detection. Sub
stitution and transposition ciphers are unable to fulfill these
needs and are therefore, inadequate. As a result, other ciphers
which are better suited must be sought out (Hsiao & Kerr, 1978)
(Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
Product Ciphers
Transposition and substitution ciphers are seldom used by
themselves primarily due to their vulnerability to cryptanalytic
attack. However, the combination of these two techniques with
19
other methods allows them to become important components in more
complex cipher systems (Katzan, 1966).
Product ciphers consist of both transposition and substitu
tion techniques. If transposition and substitution ciphers are
properly combined and iterated a number of times, they provide
a high degree of security, much more than they would otherwise
provide by themselves (Feistel, 1971) (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
Product ciphers enable the construction of a strong system from
simple, individually weak components. Thus the elementary
schemes of substitution and transposition, which act as low cost
building blocks, can be efficiently combined to form complex ci
phers (Lempel, 1979).
Principles of Confusion and Diffusion
Diffusion and confusion are two other techniques by which
complex cipher systems can be generated. They are especially
useful in information-oriented systems which require a flexible
cipher that is capable of error detection.
The purpose of diffusion is to diffuse or spread local sta
tistics throughout the length of the message. Diffusion at
tempts to eliminate some of the correlations and dependencies
among the variables and in this way an intruder has to intercept
larger amounts of enciphered material in order to decipher even
a small portion of the message (Lempel, 1979).
The principle of confusion, on the other hand, is based up
on nonlinear substitution. This principle dictates that even
though large amounts of enciphered material may be intercepted,
the relationship between the original message and the enciphered
20
[Version is so complex that a cryptanalyst would still find it
(extremely difficult to make any headway in cracking the cipher.
(Confusion relies upon making the functional dependencies among
the related variables as complex as possible, so as to maximize
the time required for cryptanalysis (Lempel, 1979). As a re-
Jsult, the work factor is very high and consequently, this prin
ciple offers good security measures (Difffie & Hellman, 1979).
i Shannon, who was responsible for important contributions
during the early theoretical development of cryptography, has
j argued that the alternate sandwiching of simple ciphers with
jthe principles of confusion and diffusion, produces a cipher
i
jthat is highly resistant to cryptanalytic attack (Walker, et.
jail., 1977). Thus the use of both of these principles is capable
of producing a very flexible and secure cipher system (Diffie &
Hellman, 1979).
Principles Underlying Present-Day Ciphers
Cryptograhic systems can be classified into two broad types:
stream ciphers and block ciphers (Diffie & Hellman, 1976).
The use of either type of cipher affects not only the strength
|of the algorithm but also has strong implications for computer
use as well (Popek & Kline, 1979).
stream ciphers
Stream ciphers process the plaintext message bit by bit or
character by character. The entire preceding portion of the
Imessage, as well as the key and the current bits are used to
determine how to encipher the next bits of the message (Popek &
Kline, 1979) (Lempel, 1979). Consequently, the incoming charac-
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ters are not treated independently (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
In many cases, a sufficiently long substring of the key uniquely
determines the succeeding elements of the key string. This al
lows the stream cipher to be vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack.
This vulnerability, however, can be offset if special care is
taken to ensure that the key string bits are a complex function
of their predecessors (Lempel, 1979).
t
block ciphers
In contrast to stream ciphers, the basic structure of a
typical present day block cipher is an iterated product cipher,
with transposition and substitution as its main components (Lem
pel, 1979). Block ciphers divide the plaintext message into
blocks, usually of fixed size with the block length ranging
from 32 to 128 bits or characters. Encryption is performed by
ij enciphering each successive block of the message on the basis
!|
|j of that block alone and the given key (Popek & Kline, 1979).
ii
i! Therefore, unlike stream ciphers, each block is operated on in-
i|
j| dependent ly of the previous one (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
stream versus block encipherment
Whereas it is easier to construct strong stream ciphers
as compared to strong block ciphers, an unfortunate characteris
tic of stream ciphers deals with error propagation. A single
error in any given block results in all subsequent blocks being
undecipherable, and therefore, in error (Popek & Kline 1979).
This is directly related to the fact that the encipherment of
the plaintext is dependent upon all of the preceding bits or
characters (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
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In general, stream
ciphers are less acceptable for computer
use than are block ciphers. In order to update any portion of a
lengthy ciphertext, not only must the relevant bits
be reencrypt
ed but also all subsequent bits of the stream as well. Block
ciphers, on the other hand, facilitate updating. All
that is
required is to decrypt the relevant block of ciphertext, update
it, and reencrypt that particular block. No other
blocks need
to be changed. Primarily due to their ease in application,
block ciphers are usually preferred (popek & Kline, 1970).
A Block Cipher Called DES
A prime example of a block cipher is the Data Encryption
Standard or DES. Essentially, the DES is composed of transpo
sition and substitution operations. After the information
to be enciphered undergoes the transposition and substitution
operations, the resulting cipher is
reentered into the same
'enciphering process. Thus the cipher that is produced is called
a recirculating product cipher. Since the DES operates only on
a fixed length data block, it may be precisely referred to as a
recirculating block product cipher (Branstad, 1977) (Bright &
Enison, 1978).
In November 1976, the Department of Commerce approved the
Data Encryption Standard as a Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS). The adoption of the DES as a standard makes
it mandatory for all Federal Government agencies to use this
algorithm to ensure cryptographic protection of computer data.
Only those Federal agencies which have been specifically ex
empted as well as nongovernmental institutions are not required
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to use the Data Encryption Standard (Dinardo, 1978). With the
adoption of this standard, it is hoped that this will signifi
cantly increase the use of encryption devices to protect com
puter systems in both the areas of communications and informa
tion storage (Branstad, 1977).
This algorithm employs a 64 bit key to encipher and deci
pher binary-coded data. The data is partitioned into blocks,
which are 64 bits long, prior to the encryption/decryption pro
cess. Since the algorithm is made public, the key is of prime
importance because it is the sole means by which the security
of the data is maintained. It is this 64 bit key which is re
sponsible for the generation of a unique block of ciphertext
from each block of plaintext (Katzan, 1977). Decryption of the
enciphered information is conducted through a reversal of the
algorithmic process which was used to transform the original
l| plaintext into ciphertext. The same key that was used for
j:i encryption must also be used for decryption. Therefore, unau
thorized individuals who have intercepted the ciphertext and
have knowledge of the algorithm can not recover the original
plaintext message without knowledge of the unique key which was
employed for encryption (National Bureau of Standards, 1977).
The Data Encryption Standard can be implemented in software
or on a single LSI chip and can be used with any computer to
encrypt and decrypt transmitted data (Hellman, 1979). Thus
cryptographic transformations are made possible among different
terminals, devices, etc., thereby allowing communications among
diverse computer systems (Hsiao & Kerr, 1978).
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Lucifer - A Model for the DES
Motivated by the growing need for data protection in their
products, IBM initiated cryptographic research centering around
nonlinear block ciphers in the late 1960's. This work signifi
cantly increased unclassified literature on cryptography and al
so produced several important cryptosystems (Diffie & Hellman,
1979). One of these, a cryptosystem named Lucifer, which was
developed in 1972, was to later become the prototype for the
Data Encryption Standard (Dinardo, 1978).
The Lucifer algorithm enciphers or deciphers fixed length
blocks consisting of 16 bytes or 128 bits. Each block is pro
cessed independently of all other blocks and is under the con
trol of a 128 random bit key. This key can be furnished from a
magnetic strip-card or from a plug-in 16 byte read-only store
module (Girdansky, 1971).
Each 16 byte block is divided into t\io halves prior to en
cryption. The top half consists of the first 8 bytes of the
plaintext message while the bottom half consists of the latter
8 bytes. The following functions play a vital role in the
encipherment of the data.
confusion: Eight bits are selected from the key. The value of
each of these 8 bits (be it a 0 or 1) is used to determine which
of two unique one-to-one, nonlinear transformations will be per
formed on a copy of each of the 8 bytes in the top half of the
message group. This operation is known as "confusion" and the
resulting 8 bytes, which are subjected to the keyed nonlinear
transformations, are referred to as "confused bytes".
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key interruption: The eight "confused
bytes"
are then added to
the eight selected bytes of the key by modulo-2 addition. The
purpose of this operation is to effectively interrupt the
crypt-
analyst's attempts to decipher the encrypted message, thus the
name key interruption.
diffusion: The resulting eight bytes of the modulo-2 addition
|are then permuted in a random fashion. The result of this per-
i
biutation undergoes pairwise convolution with the eight bytes
which comprise the bottom half of the message by modulo-2 addi
tion.
interchange: Finally, the topmost eight bytes are then inter
changed with the eight bytes which form the bottom half (Feistel,
et. al.
, 1971) (Smith, 1971).
The entire encryption process consists of sixteen rounds of
[confusion-interruption-diffusion operations, alternated with
fifteen interchanges of the two halves. For each round, a dif
ferent set of eight bits is selected from the key. The final
jresult of the encipherment is a unique sixteen byte ciphertext
^hich represents the original sixteen message bytes (Feistel,
jet, al.
, 1971)(Girsdansky, 1971) (Smith, 1971).
In performing these sixteen rounds, the selection of the
key bits is such that each of the 128 bits, which make up the
key, is used nine times
- once as the control bit to govern the
nonlinear transformations for confusion and eight times as a
key interruption bit in each of the eight different bit posi
tions (Smith, 1971).
In order for the entire encryption process to be reversed
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for deciphering, the eight bytes which form the top half must
be retained unaltered during any confusion-interruption-diffu
sion operation. In addition, the same key bits used for the
encryption process must be retained. The only requirement is
that the order of the operations be reversed. This means that
the first confusion-interruption-diffusion operation executed
for the decryption process must be the last one performed for
the encipherment (see chart below) ( Smith, 1971).
plaintext plaintext







Round 2 - confusion-interruption-diffusion-
interchange






Round 16 - confusion-interruption-diffusion
ciphertext ciphertext
Introduction to the Data Encryption Standard
The Data Encryption Standard, which is a reduced modifica
tion of the Lucifer algorithm, operates on 64 bit blocks of
data (Lempel, 1979). Like Lucifer, the DES requires that the
same secret key be used for both encryption and decryption
(Everton, 1978). Decryption is accomplished using the same
key as that used for encryption, with the exception being that
the schedule of addressing the key bits is reversed so that the
deciphering process is the inverse of the enciphering process
(Branstad, 1977). Thus, the invertible transformation can be
~T~
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described by the following equations:
C = Sk(P) P = Sk-l(C)
In these equations, P denotes a 64 bit block of plaintext; C,
a 64 bit block of ciphertext; k, the 64 bit key; Sk, the enci
phering transformation when key k is used; and Sk^ , the deci
phering process (Diffie & Hellman, 1977).
As with Lucifer, the Data Encryption Standard also relies
upon sixteen rounds or iterations of a block enciphering process
where each iteration is composed of the permutation of the block!
and the operation of some complicated function. In the DES, thejj
i!
complicated function involves a substitution process on small ij
sub-blocks of the data. Both of these operations, the
permuta- j
tion and the complicated function, are controlled by a key
which is dependent upon the round (Davida, et. al. , 1978).
In actuality, only 56 of the 64
bits which make up the key
are used for the encryption/decryption process. The remaining
eight bits are used solely for parity error detection. Conse
quently, the key is
divided into eight 8 bit bytes, where the
first seven bits of each byte are used by the algorithm while
the last or eighth bit is used to maintain odd parity (Lempel,
1979) (Diffie & Hellman, 1977).
Specifics of the Algorithm
The 64 bit block to be enciphered undergoes three major
steps during the encryption process: an initial permutation,
signified by IP, then to a recirculating block product cipher
process which consists of sixteen rounds of a block enciphering
process
.
and finally to a permutation which is the inverse of
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The first step in the encryption process is to divide the
plaintext into blocks of 64 bits in length. Each 64 bit block
is then subjected to an initial permutation (IP) which is per
formed according to the following table.
IP
58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
60 52 44 36 28 10 12 4
62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8
57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
This operation results in the 58th bit of the input block be
coming the first bit of the permuted block; the 50th bit of the
input block, the second bit of the permuted block; the 42th bit|
the third; and so on, until the 7th input bit becomes the last
bit of the permuted block. The resulting 64 bit permuted block
is then used as input to a complex key-dependent computation or
product transformation which consists of sixteen iterations (re^
circulating block product cipher process) (Branstad, 1977).
The recirculating block product enciphering process con
sists of a series of substitutions and transpositions. The
substitutions are performed under the control of a cipher key
while the transpositions are executed according to a predeter
mined sequence (Katzan, 1977). Prior to each iteration, the
64 bit block of plaintext is divided into two halves or data
vectors. The first 32 bits of the input block make up the left
29
half while the remaining 32 bits form the right-hand vector,
and are denoted by L- and R.f respectively (Branstad, 1977).
In the next step, the right-hand data vector becomes the left
most 32 bits of the output block. Thus L. = R. -,. The right
most 32 bits of the input block, r. ,, undergo a selection pro
cess which results in a 48 bit data block. Note that this
selection process is not key dependent.
A 48 bit subkey, K , is associated with each iteration,
thus there are 16 subkeys. This subkey is generated from the
64 bit key and represents a unique subkey which corresponds to
the j^th iteration of the product transformation. This 48 bit
subkey is then added to the resulting 48 bit data block obtaineci
through the selection process as defined above by modulo 2 addi-l
tion. The output of this step is a 48 bit block which is par<-
titioned into eight groups consisting of 6 bits each. Each 6
bit group is further subjected to a unique substitution cipher
that results in a 4 bit group. Thus the final result of this
process is a 32 bit output consisting of eight 4 bit groups.
This output then undergoes a permutation operation which yields
a 32 bit permuted block. This 32 bit permuted block is added
(modulo 2 addition) to the lefthand data vector, L. lf to yield
R.
,
which is the righthand data vector of the 64 bit outprit
block (see figure 9c) (Branstad, 1977) (Katzan, 1977) (National
Bureau of Standards, 1977).
The entire process outline above, is repeated 16 times
and thus constitutes the major portion of the recirculating
gck j3rQdiicJ:_eng.ipJ^ej^n^_jpxQcea^ f inajLs-t-pp -in t->n,s
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operation is the interchange of the left and right halves of the
output from the last iteration. This result is frequently re
ferred to as the preoutput block (Katzan, 1977).
Since the deciphering process is the exact reversal of en
cipherment, decryption occurs by applying the very same algo
rithm to the enciphered message block. The only requirement is
that at each iteration of the computation, the same subkey is
used for decipherment as was used during encryption. Thus the





(Katzan, 1977) (National Bureau of Standards, 1977).
the cipher function
The cipher function, f, is the heart of the recirculating
block product enciphering process. This function, which is
used in each iteration of the product transformation, may be
symbolically denoted by f(R. , K ) where R. represents a string
of 32 bits (data) and K is the 48 bit subkey generated from
j the 64 bit key (Katzan, 1977). The output of this function is
I
j
! a 32 bit block obtained by the following process. The 32 bit
data vector, R. , , is expanded into 48 bits as briefly described
[ in the previous section. This 48 bit block is denoted by
E(R.
-.),
where E represents a function which takes a 32 bit
i block as input and produces a 48 bit block as output. The 48
bit block is written as eight groups of 6 bits and the bits are
obtained by selecting the following input bits:
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E Bit-Selection Table
32 1 2 3 4 5
4 5 6 7 8 9
8 9 10 11 12 13
12 13 14 15 16 17
16 17 18 19 20 21
20 21 22 23 24 25
24 25 26 27 28 29
28 29 30 31 32 1
Thus the 32nd bit of R. , becomes the first bit of E(R. ,), and
1x 1 J.
o on, until the first bit of Rj i becomes the 48th bit of
E(R. (for a schematic diagram of the cipher function, see
figure 10) (Katzan, 1977).
Each of the functions S,
, S2, S3, ... , So, as shown in
figure 11, is a unique selection function which has as its input
i
a 6 bit block and yields a 4 bit block as output. These eight




iRow # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 14 4 13 1 2 15 11 8 3 10 6 12 5 9 0 7
1 0 15 7 4 14 2 13 1 10 6 12 11 9 5 3 8
2 4 1 14 8 13 6 2 11 15 12 9 7 3 10 5 0
3 15 12 8 2 4 9 1 7 5
2
4 9
11 3 14 10 0 6 13
0 15 1 8 14 6 11 3 7 2 13 12 0 5 10
1 3 13 4 7 15 2 8 14 12 0 1 10 6 9 11 5
2 0 14 7 11 10 4 13 1 5 8 12 6 9 3 2 15
3 13 8 10 1 3 15 4 2 11
S3
6 7 12 0 5 14 9
0 10 0 9 14
1 13 7 0 9
2 13 6 4 9
3 1 10 13 0
6 3 15 5 1 13 12 7 11 4 2 8
3 4 6 10 2 8 5 14 12 11 15 1
8 15 3 0 11 1 2 12 5 10 14 7
6 9 8 7 4 15 14 3 11 5 2 12
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Column Number
Row # 0 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 7 13 14 3 0 6 9 10 1 2 8 5 11 12 4 15
1 13 8 11 5 6 15 0 3 4 7 2 12 1 10 14 9
2 10 6 9 0 12 11 7 13 15 1 3 14 5 2 8 4
3 3 15 0 6 10 1 13 8 9
S,
4 5 11 12 7 2 14
0 2 12 4 1 7 10 11 6 8 5 3 15 13 0 14 9
1 14 11 2 12 4 7 13 1 5 0 15 10 3 9 8 6
2 4 2 1 11 10 13 7 8 15 9 12 5 6 3 0 14
3 11 8 12 7 1 14 2 13 6
S6
15 0 9 10 4 5 3
0 12 1 10 15 9 2 6 8 0 13 3 4 14 7 5 11
1 10 15 4 2 7 12 9 5 6 1 13 14 0 11 3 8
2 9 14 15 5 2 8 12 3 7 0 4 10 1 13 11 6
3 4 3 2 12 9 5 15 10 11 14 1 7 6 0 8 13
0 4 11 2 14 15 0 8 13 3 12 9 7 5 10 6 1
1 13 0 11 7 4 9 1 10 14 3 5 12 2 15 8 6
2 1 4 11 13 12 3 7 14 10 15 6 8 0 5 9 2
3 6 11 13 8 1 4 10 7 9 5 0 15 14 2 3 12
fs
0 13 2 8 4 6 15 11 1 10 9 3 14 5 0 12 7
1 1 15 13 8 10 3 7 4 12 5 6 11 0 14 9 2
2 7 11 4 1 9 12 14 2 0 6 10 13 15 3 5 8
3 2 1 14 7 4 10 8 13 15 12 9 0 3 5 6 11
Each selection function, S. , takes a 6-bit block as input
and yields a 4-bit result. Thus, input to the unique set of se
llection functions S1 through Sg is a 48 bit block, which is de
noted as B1B2B3B4B5B6B7Bg where each Bi is composed of 6 bits.
^ serves
as input to the selection function S-,; B? to S-; and
so on. The resulting 4 bit block from a single selection functi
1
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may be denoted by S.(B.) where S. is the selection function and
B. is its argument (Katzan, 1977). The calculation of this 4
bit block S.(B.) occurs as follows: The first and last bits of
B. represent a value in base 2 with a range from 0 to 3. This |j
!i
binary number is denoted by i. The middle four bits of B. also
represent a binary value. This value is denoted by j and is in
the range 0 through 15. Using the table, S., which corresponds
to the argument B.. the intersection of the . th row and the .th^ i'
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column yields decimal value in the range from 0 through 15. Thi^
decimal number can be uniquely represented as a binary value or
4 bit block. It is this four-bit block which represents the
output for S.(B.) for the input B. (Branstad, 19 77) (National
Bureau of Standards, 1977).
As an illustration of this operation suppose that the six
bit input B, is the binary value 101010. The first and last
bits of B, represent the value 2, therefore, the designated row
of table S-, is the second row and the variable i is equivalent
to the value 2. The next step is to extract the middle four
bits of B. which is the value 0101. This value is the binary
representation of 5, therefore, j=5 and the designated column
is the fifth one. Referring to table S-, , the value found at the |
intersection of the second row and the fifth column is the deci
mal value 6. This represents the binary value 0110 and is thus
the output for the selection function S-^B^ (Katzan, 1977)
(see figure 12).
The next operation to occur after the selection functions
h_S8-is a permutatJ-oxL^functioirL^.J-r,Aich_uss_,a 32^
.Jhi_
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block as input to produce a 32 bit block as output. The permu
tation occurs according to the following table:
P
16 7 20 21
29 12 28 17
1 15 23 26
5 18 31 10
2 8 24 14
32 27 3 9
19 13 30 6
22 11 4 25
This 32 bit permuted block is obtained by taking the 16th bit
of the 32 bit result of the set of selection functions as the
first bit of the permuted block, the seventh bit as the second
bit of the permuted block, and so on (National Bureau of Stand
ards, 1977). This 32 bit block represents the output for the
cipher function, f, for inputs R. and K (Katzan, 1977).
the key schedule calculations
The key schedule calculations are responsible for generat
ing the 16 subkeys, denoted as K , used during the encryption/
decryption process. Permutation, selection, and shifting opera
tions are employed to calculate the 48 bit subkey, K .
Not all of the 64 bits which comprise the key are used
to calculate the subkeys. In fact, only 56 of the 64 bits that
make up the key are actually used. Since the key is partitioned
into eight 8-bit bytes, one bit in each byte is utilized for
error detection. Consequently, the 8th, 16th, ..., and 64th
bits of the key are used to assure the odd parity of each byte
(Katzan, 1977) (National Bureau of Standards, 1977). These eight




The initial step in the execution of the key schedule
compu-
jtations is to subject the non-parity bits in the key to a permu
tation operation. This permutation operation may be described
by the following table and yields two 28-bit blocks denoted by
0
and DQ (the leftmost and rightmost blocks, respectively).
Permuted Choice 1 (PC-1)
57 49 41 33 25 17 9 63 55 47 39 31 23 15
1 58 50 42 34 26 18 7 62 54 46 38 30 22
10 2 59 51 43 35 27 14 6 61 53 45 37 29
19 11 3 60 52 44 36 21 13 5 28 20 12 4
yields CQ yields DQ
(see figure 13) Thus, bits 57, 49, 41, ... , 60, 52, 44, and
36 specify the 28 bit block CQ while bits 63, 55, 47, 39, ... ,
28, 20, 12, and 4 represent DQ (Branstad, 1977) (Katzan, 1977).
The generation of blocks CQ and DQ represent the starting
fooint for computing the subkeys. Hereafter, the blocks C. -, and
::). , for i = 2,..., 16 are generated according to a schedule of
left shifts for the individual blocks (Katzan, 1977). Following
the generation of blocks CQ and DQ, the 28-bit blocks C, and D,
are formed by circularly shifting CQ and DQ left one place. Sub-
key K, is then generated by selecting specified bits from C-, and
j}, . Blocks Cx
and
D.^ are once again shift left one place to
j
iyield C2 and D2.
Selected bits are chosen from these two blocks
jto form subkey K2. This entire process continues for subkeys
K3 through K16
with blocks C^<->1 and D. ^ being generated accord




















The computation of each of the subkeys K, through K-,6 is
done by means of a second permutation operation, denoted as per
muted choice 2 or PC-2 (Katzan, 1977). Thus a particular key K
is selected from the concatenation of C and D according to the
permutation operation described by the following table:
PC-2
14 17 11 24 1 5
3 28 15 6 21 10
23 19 12 4 26 8
16 7 27 20 13 2
41 52 31 37 47 55
30 40 51 45 33 48
44 49 39 56 34 53
46 42 50 36 29 32
i for a schematic representation of this second permutation opera-
tion, please refer to figure 14 - a summary of the key schedule
(Calculations is given in figure 15). I
This completes a description of the Data Encryption Stand




and P is critical to the strength of the encryption/decrypticjifi
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process (Branstad, 1977) (National Bureau of Standards, 1977)
(Morris, et. al . , 1977).
Is the Data Encryption Standard Secure?
Since the development of the Data Encryption Standard and
its subsequent adoption as a standard, much criticism has been
raised as to the security of this algorithm. A current battle
is raging over the question of whether or not the standard is a
strong algorithm.
The alledged weaknesses of the Data Encryption Standard
were'
first brought to the forefront a little over five years ago when
Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie voiced their concern over the
inadequacy of this standard to effectively protect sensitive data
(Kolata, 1977). Dr. Hellman argues that the encryption standard
is only marginally secure and consequently, is not adequate
a-
gainst commercial data thefts (Sugarman, 1979). Both Dr. Hel
lman and Whitfield Diffie believe that the standard will have to
be redesigned in the next few years in order to permit it to
withstand attacks from newly developed higher technology (Yasaki,
1976) (Morris, et. al. , 1977).
The main criticism against the Data Encryption standard is
the belief that the key is too short. Since key size is the pri
mary determinant of the ease with which a cipher can be broken,
Critics such as Dr. Hellman believe that the standard's 56 bit
key (64 bits - 8 parity bits) is too short to provide protection
against a brute force attack using a special large purpose com
puter (Branstad, 1977). Current technology makes it possible to
esign a computer, which employs a special search chip, that is
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capable of testing one million keys per second. Thus, the imple-*
mentation of a million of these search chips in parallel would
make it feasible to break the Data Encryption Standard, with its
2 2* 101' possible keys, in one day (Morris, et. . , 1977).
Although the estimated cost of such a machine would be approxi
mately twenty million dollars, due to the depreciation in the may
chine's cost over the next five years, the daily operating cost
would drop to only ten thousand dollars. As computation and
hardware costs drop even more in the near future, the cost of
this code breaking machine would drop substantially (Kolata,
1977).
Hellman and Diffie claim that the security of the Data En
cryption Standard can be substantially improved by increasing
the key length from the current 56 bits (64 bits with the inclu
sion of the 8 parity bits) to 128 or even 256 bits. The use of
!a 128 bit key would increase the estimated cost for a brute force
search to $2 x
1025
with the added benefit that no foreseeable
i
technological advances would allow the cost to be brought into
reasonable range (Diffie & Hellman, 1977).
Those who support the Data Encryption Standard, such as Dr.
Ruth Davis, director of the Institute of Computer Sciences and
Technology at the National Bureau of Standards, argue that the
current key size of the standard is more than adequate for today'
technology and therefore, meets present-day needs (Kolata 1977),
Dr. Davis states that a standard's objectives are different from
technological objectives and consequently, the predicted five
year life-span of the DES algorithm is more than adequate. After
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all, there is no guarantee that enlarging the key size to 128
bits will prevent future technological advances from cracking
the cipher system. This plus the added cost of the semiconductor
chip in which the algorithm is implemented as well as the number
of chips required are major factors used in the argument against
the implementation of a larger key (Yasaki, 1976).
Despite the fact that the arguments over the security level
provided by the DES are far from resolved, it is generally felt
that this standard is adequate in its simplest form for normal
i {business applications. If a higher level of security is needed.
ij
jthe use of multiple encryption can be employed to compensate for
i
jthe small key size (Yasaki, 1976) (Branstad, et. al. , 1976).
Summary of Part One
Up until this point, this paper has attempted to provide
the reader with the necessary background information needed
to gain a more thorough understanding of cryptography. The pre
vious sections have dealt with the development of cryptography
from an art to a science and the subsequent transformations of
| cryptographic practices throughout history. Two cryptographic
(algorithms, Lucifer and the Data Encryption Standard, were pre-
! sented so as to enable the reader to observe what is involved
in the design of a cipher system. Although most cipher systems
such as these, are composed of two elementary cryptographic
operations, substitution and transposition, the combination of
these operations produces a fairly complex algorithm.
Part Two deals with the use of encryption as a means of
enhancing operating system security. The use of encipherment
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within the operating system is used primarily for authentication
purposes. This means ensuring that the user is who he claims to
oe and that only authorized individuals have access to data
stored within the system. This and other related topics will be




Operating system security ultimately involves a multi-user,
multi-programming environment (Hsiao & Kerr, 1978). Thus the
primary goals of operating system security include the
preven- i
tion of any unauthorized access to data stored within the sys
tem, the safeguarding of users from undesirable results trig- '
gered by their own actions, the assurance that various user pro
grams will not interfere with one another, and the ability of
different users to have different rights and abilities to co- j
operate with each other (Davida, et. al. , 1978).
As a result of the operating system being responsible for i
the management and control of all computer hardware resources,
operating system security is of vital importance. For this
reason, the issues which deal with operating system security
are critical and far reaching (Hsiao & Kerr, 1978).
Network Security Threats
A computer network is usually a rather large, single sys
tem which has been created from numerous individual computer
systems. As a result, the data processing functions must now
be distributed among a set of distinct systems thus decentralize
ing the control of data storage and processing, in addition
information which must be transmitted between the various com
puters within the network is subject to exposure. Forged user
identification and unauthorized access to stored data by legit
imate users are also problems which plague a multi-user multi-
resource environment. Consequently, these factors combine to
complicate the problem of ensuring a high degree of security
42
within the network and may present formidable pitfalls (Bright &j
I
Enison, 1978). |
Encryption and Network Security j
Security problems such as monitoring of communications and !
user authentication may be alleviated through the use of encryp-j
tion. In the past, protection against the monitoring of com
munication lines was guaranteed by the use of physically secure
lines. This technique, however, proved to be extremely expen
sive and, often times, impractical. Since that time, it has beer
discovered that data encryption may be used as a viable alterna
tive to secure lines (Bright & Enison, 1978) (Davida, et. al. ,
1978).
With regard to the problem of identification and authentica
tion of users, user identification has usually been performed
by an identification number and a secret password known only to
the user. Presently, a method x-rhich relies upon the one-way
encipherment of passwords is being tested. This method has beer.
proven to be extremely useful in verifying user identification [
while maintaining the secrecy of the password (Bright & Enison, j
1978).
Thus it can be seen that encryption may be employed as a
solution to computer network security problems and consequently
a valuable tool in operating systems security (Davida, et. al.
1978). Cryptographic technology is, therefore, a relatively in
expensive and highly effective process by which sensitive data
may be protected against disclosure (Bright & Enison 1978).
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Implementation of Encryption within the Network
Link encryption and end-to-end encryption are two means by
which cryptography can be applied to computer networks. The de
cision as to which of the two methods will be implemented is de
pendent upon whether or not encryption is regarded as a responsi
bility of the network or of the users (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Link encryption is a low-level encryption which is used pri-j-
marily for packet switching. All information sent through the
network is encrypted and decrypted at each node through which
the information passes. Consequently, all data including even
address information, is encrypted (Popek & Kline, 1979).
End-to-end encryption, on the other hand, is of a higher
level of integration than link encryption. In this process,
the information is encrypted only once at its source with de
cryption occurring only after the data has arrived at its final
destination. Unlike link encryption, this technique has the
advantage of protecting the data throughout its entire journey
(Diffie & Hellman, 1979) (Sykes, 1976).
The level of integration used within the computer network
significantly influences the number of keys which must be gener
ated and distributed as well as the amount of software which
must be employed (Popek & Kline, 1979). in general, the higher
the level of integration required, the greater the need for
matched key pairs which must be separately distributed and/or
the number of previously arranged secure channels. Although a
higher level of integration frequently entails additional cost
and greater complexity, a significant reduction in the amount
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of properly functioning software results (Diffie & Hellman, 1979). j
i
fretwork Applications of Encrvotion
Within the computer netxrork, encryption may be used for both;
,'l
message and user authentication, private communications, network
mail, and/or digital signatures (Popek & Kline, 1979) (Diffie &
Hellman, 1976). Each of these areas is discussed in further
detail below.
authentication
One of the foremost functions of network security is the
authentication of both messages and users. User authentication
permits secure communications among various participants by
ensuring that the individuals are who they claim to be (Diffie &
Hellman, 1976). Consequently, this eliminates the possibility
of another individual masquerading as a valid system user (Popek
& Kline, 1979).
Message authentication verifies the legitimacy of the
message. Encryption ensures message authentication by assuming
that the possession of the correct key is a primary prerequisite
to participation in message exchanges while knowledge of the
proper password ensures user authentication (Diffie & Hellman
1976).
private communication
Encryption plays a vital role in permitting secure communi
cations to occur where an insecure transmission medium is being
employed. As a result, encryption has been used solely for
communication purposes in the past (Bartek, 1974).
Two prerequisites for private communication are a secure
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channel and the presence of all participating parties. During
the initial stages of establishing a secure channel, overhead is
frequently incurred. This overhead takes the form of a fairly
complex key distribution algorithm which requires several mes
sages and the interaction of all participants (Popek & Kline,
1979).
network mail
The overhead required for private communications may be im
practical for network mail primarily due to the transmission of
short messages which is characteristic of electronic mail. Un
like private communications, this situation does not require the
receiver of the message to be present at the time of the trans
mission. Thus it may be possible to get lower overhead at the
cost of increased queuing delays (Popek & Kline, 1979).
digital signatures
A digital signature is a means of providing evidence to a
third party that a specified communication is exactly as re
ceived from a particular sender (Needham & Schroeder, 1978).
Thus the author of a digitally represented message may "sign it
in such a manner that the "signature" has properties similar to
a hand-written signature (Rivest, et. al. , 1978). Digital sig- j
natures protect against forgery and repudiation of authorship
while providing authentication at a relatively low cost (Popek
& Kline', 1979).
Limitations of Encryption
Although in most cases encryption can be used to enhance sej-
curity measures, there are practical limitations to encryption's
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viability. These limitations are discussed below.
processing in plaintext
Most of the arithmetic operations require the data to be
supplied in plaintext form. Since the data may not be in en
crypted form, additional emphasis is placed upon the internal
controls of the operating system to maintain adequate security
measures for the plaintext data. Various suggestions have been
made for solving this problem including one such solution which
employs an encoding algorithm which is horaomorphic with respect
to the desired arithmetic operations. Although this technique
would permit the desired operations to be performed on the en
crypted values, known encoding schemes which fulfill the neces
sary properties are not very secure algorithms. It is feared
that strong algorithms with these properties can not be con
structed. Therefore, since data must be processed in plaintext ,
other means are necessary to protect data from being compromised
while the data is under the control of the operating system
(Popek & Kline, 1979).
revocation
The methods used for selective revocation of access to data
are very complex. Currently, the only known means of revoking
access to a particular piece of data is to render the cor
responding key void. This can only be accomplished by de
crypting the data and re-enciphering it under a different key.
This action, however, is not very selective since all old keys
are invalidated. Hence new keys must be redistributed to all




Despite the fact that encryption can not guard against in
advertent or intentional modification of data, it can serve as a
means of detecting that modification. The inclusion of a number
of check bits within the encrypted data permits the comparison
Df these bits (upon decryption) with expected values. If a match
does not occur, then the data is invalid due to modification.
The use of encryption to detect data modification, however, is
troublesome in situations where a long period of time has elapsed
before a particular data item is referenced. In cases such as
this, data modification may occur unnoticed until long after the ;
incident has been carried out. Thus, detection of modification
may not provide adequate protection for sensitive information
(Popek & Kline, 1979).
key storage and management
The problem of key storage arises in those situations in
which a specific data item needs to be protected independently
of all other data items. This requires the use of a unique key
to encrypt the particular data item. This problem becomes quite
troublesome when it is necessary to protect numerous long-lived
data items separately. In situations such as this the key storag^
and management problem becomes formidable (Diffie & Hellman
1976) (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Public-Key Cryptosystems versus Conventional Cryptosystems
The security of cipher systems in the past, relied solely
upon the secrecy of the entire encryption process. Modern
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cipher systems, however, have dispersed this shroud of secrecy
thus enabling the algorithm to be made public without compro
mising the system's security (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). These
ciphers - the conventional cryptosystems of today - consist of
a key which is supplied along with the plaintext message as in
put to the enciphering algorithm. The security of this system
resides in maintaining the secrecy of the key. Although the
conventional cryptosystems have provided adequate data protectio^
in the past, the development of an even newer encryption pro
cedure provides an even greater promise for added security.
This new class of encryption procedures is based on a group of
mathematical problems which are characterized by computational
intractability. This type of system was first proposed by
Ralph Merkle, Whitfield Diffie, and Martin Hellman, and is calle^
a public-key cryptosystem (Hellman, 1979). Unlike any previous
cipher system, the public-key cryptosystems permit the revela
tion of not only the algorithm but the key used for encipherment
as well (Diffie & Hellman, 1976) (Hellman, 1979).
conventional encryption
The encryption/decryption process within conventional cryp^
tosystems can be described by the following equations:
E = F(D,K)
- data encryption D = F*(E,K)
D signifies the data to be encoded, K is the key, E is the
resulting ciphertext, and F represents a function. The second
equation permits the recovery of the original plaintext data




represents the inverse of the function F. Since the
security of conventional cryptosystems is dependent upon main
taining the secrecy of the key, the use of the functions F and
F' is valuable only if it is impractical to recover the original
plaintext message from the ciphertext without knowledge of the
corresponding key (Popek & Kline, 1979).
To gain a better understanding of this type of cipher sys
tem, equate the conventional cryptosystem with a strongbox
having a resettable combination lock. Prior to any message ex-
j
changes, a key must be mutually agreed upon by both the sender
and the receiver. This key, which is actually a sequence of
i
numbers, serves as the combination of the lock. Once a key has j
been selected, the sender may then place his message in the <
strongbox, set the combination, and lock the box. Assuming that:
the cryptosystem (or strongbox) is secure, no third party who
intercepts the box during its journey to its final destination |
will be able to break the lock and discover the contents, in j
i
this way, conventional cryptosystems prevent the extraction of j
information from an insecure channel and also the modification
of data within the channel (Hellman, 1979).
Despite the fact that conventional cipher systems are ;
capable of protecting sensitive data, several disadvantages of
this type of system are particularly troublesome to users. i
Maintaining the secrecy of the key has proved to be the major |
drawback of this system. Since both the receiver and the sender
must agree upon a key prior to any message transmissions plus
the-jfac-t tha t. the entire-security of -thtss^stBm^s_ dependent- f^
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upon the secrecy of the key, it is vital that the key be trans
mitted by means of a secure channel (i.e. a trusted courier). |
This key distribution problem compounds itself in situations
where the sender and receiver have had no prior communication
or where the network is extremely large. If a large network musftp
rely upon couriers to distribute the needed keys, this technique
soon becomes too prohibitive and thus, impractical (Hellman,
1979) (Diffie & Hellman, 1976).
Another disadvantage of conventional cipher systems involves
message authentication. As a result of the same key being used
for both encryption and decryption, there is no guarantee that
the receiver will not send himself messages which appear to have
been generated by the sender. Forgeries such as this, could
create serious problems within the network. Consequently, con
ventional cryptosystems can not ensure the authenticity of the
message in the same manner that the exchange of signed documents
can. For this reason, conventional cryptosystems are being a-
bandoned in favor of public-key cryptosystems which are capable
of solving both the key distribution problem and the problem of
message authentication (Hellman, 1979).
public-key encryption
Public-key cipher systems define the encryption/decryption
process according to the following equations:
E = F(D,K) - for encryption D = F'(D,K') - decryption
As before, D signifies the data to be encoded, K is the key, E
is the resulting ciphertext, and
F' is the inverse function of
F-. Jtote- that a 1 though- the eaTiati^ng^hj^h-de^^rjlbei-th^-^r-ocess -j
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by which the data is enciphered or deciphered, are similar for
both public-key and conventional cryptosystems, there does exist
a distinct difference between the two techniques with regard to
the decryption process (Diffie & Hellman, 1978). Unlike con
ventional cryptosystems, the same key is not employed for both
encryption and decryption. In public-key cipher systems, the
key
K' is used for deciphering purposes. This key is not equiva!4-
lent to key K which is used to encipher the data. Furthermore,
K'
can not be derived from K. As a result, public-key
crypto-
[
systems are a variation of conventional encryption methods which




Unlike the conventional cryptosystem where both the sender j
and receiver must mutually agree upon a common key, the public-
key cipher system generates two distinct keys - an enciphering
key,K, and a deciphering key, K'. It is this generation of two
keys which is said to be the major advantage of this type of
system over the standard or conventional cipher system (Diffie &
Hellman, 1976) (Diffie & Hellman, 1979).
In contrast to the conventional system where the security
of the system is solely dependent upon maintaining the secrecy
of the key, this system's security is dependent upon the compu
tational infeasibility of deriving
K' from K. If an extremely
high work factor is associated with the calculation of the de
ciphering key, K', given the encryption key, K, then each user
can safely publish
his enciphering key in a public file and
still ensure., . th.e_fjeerecy__c?fhjLs _ deciphexlng_key whichis _pxivate -
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information (Denning, 1979). Consequently, anyone who wishes to
transmit a message to a particular individual merely enciphers
the information with that person's public enciphering key K and
sends the ciphertext. Only the intended receiver is capable of
deciphering the message since he is the only individual who has




As an illustration of how this type of system functions,
consider once again a strongbox, only this time the box has two
combinations - one to lock the box and one to unlock it. By
permitting all combinations which lock the strongbox to made
public, any individual can transmit a message or lock the in
formation in the box. The information stored within the box is
guaranteed to safely reach its destination since only the indi
vidual who ox^ns the strongbox and who has knowledge of the two
combinations will be able to open the box. Thus this system's
simplicity eliminates the need for key distribution prior to




which would prevent the forgery of messages j
(Hellman, 1979) (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). |
Many public-key cipher systems permit the use of either
the function F of F
'
for encryption purposes while the inverse
'
function is used for decryption. Thus, the data can be encrypted
using
F'
and decrypted using F or vice versa. This property
plays an important role in both key distribution and "digital
signatures". The RSA algorithm, which exemplifies this charac
teristic, is proof the use of either function for encryption
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results in a strong ciphertext (Rivest, et. al. , 1978).
Key Management
Within the network, various users are able to communicate
with one another only if they possess matching keys for both the
encryption and decryption process. Thereby, admission to the
communications channel is determined solely by the possession
of the appropriate key. Without the key, the channel is un
available. Since the task of the network is to provide as many
communication channels as is possible, the manner in which the
keys used to access the channels are generated is of vital im
portance (Popek & Kline, 1979). As a result of keys being dis
tributed over the same channels as the data is transmitted, the
only secure means of distributing the keys is through the use
of encryption. This practice is viable only if the number of
keys to be distributed is limited in number so as to ensure
that the security of the keys may be maintained (Popek & Kline,
1979)(Matyas & Meyer, 1978).
Conyentional-Key Distribution
The most frequently employed technique for conventional-key
distribution can be described as follows. Prior to the trans
mission of data, the potential participants mutually agree upon
a pair of matched keys. A single host machine is designated as
the key distribution center or KDC for the
time period of the





requests the transmission of the matched key
pairs to all participants in the communication, including him
self. This serves as the first step in initiating the connection
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It is then up to the KDC to determine whether or not to
authorize
the connection. If the desired connection is approved, secure i
messages containing the key and status information are then sent ;
!|
to each participant over prearranged channels. After this step
i
has been completed, data can then be transmitted over the newly II
established communications channel (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Var- [
iations of this approach are described in the subsequent sections!
of this paper. j
centralized key control
This approach employs a single KDC for the entire network
and for this reason is the simplest key distribution technique
possible. The number of matched key pairs required for this
method is equal to the number of entities comprising the network.
Thus, if the network is composed of n distinguishable entities,
then n prearranged matched keys are required for communication
purposes (Popek & Kline, 1979).
One drawback to this type of key management method is the
fact that network reliability may be endangered if communication
with the key distribution center is not possible. This situatioiji
may occur if
the node on which the KDC is located is not func
tioning properly or if the
network itself breaks down. There
fore in order for a single KDC to be applicable for distributed
networks the underlying communications topology must be that of
a star with the KDC located at the center of the communication
netx<7ork. However, there still
exists the possibility that the
KDC may
malfunction thus causing a complete breakdown. The only
alternative solution to this drawback involves the maintenance
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jof redundant . KDC ' s which are used solely during failures of the
jmain facility. These redundant facilities can be located at any
site which supports a secure operating system and which provides
appropriate key generation facilities.
An illustration of centralized key control may be described
as follows. Suppose that X, a member of the network, wishes to
communicate with Y, who is also a member of the network. Prior
to any message exchanges, both participants X and Y
must select
their own unique, secret keys. These two keys,
designated as Kx
and K respectively, are known only to the KDC
and to themselves,
In order to establish a connection, X sends a message to
the KDC
requesting the construction of a communication channel
with Y.
Enclosed within this request X also transmits an identifier of
some sort, such as a number,
which will be used by the KDC at a
later time. If the KDC determines this request as being a valid
one, a new key Kc will be sent to
participant X along with the
identifier (which was initially transmitted by X) , a copy of the
request, and
information which will aid in identifying X as a
legitimate participant to Y. This new key Kc is used solely for
communication purposes with Y. To ensure that the secrecy of
this key is maintained, the
transmission from the KDC to X reveaU
ing the new key is encrypted
with the key selected by participant
X K. This guarantees
that only X can receive the message and
consequently,
serves to verify the authenticity of the message.
By having the KDC
return X's identifier, this permits X to check
the identifier in order to ensure the
transmission is authentic
and not a forged message
thus verifying that the original reques
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as made by X was not altered before reception by the KDC (Popek
& Kline, 1979).
After X has received the new key from the KDC, X may then jj
proceed to transmit data to participant Y. The first step is
for X to send to Y the data from the KDC intended for Y. This
data includes not only the connection key K but proof of X's
identity as well. To ensure that only Y is able to decipher the
information, the entire transmission to Y is enciphered in Y's
secret key, K . Upon decryption of the message, Y now knows that
K is the communication key, X is the other participant in this i
communication, and that this information came from the KDC. To
ensure that the message just received by Y is authentic and not
a replay of some previous message, Y sends a unique identifier
to X encrypted by key K . Upon receipt of the identifier, X
performs some operation and obtains a result which is in turn
returned to Y. This permits participant Y to verify that the
message is indeed a current one and is not a replay of some
previous message (see figure 16) (Popek & Kline, 1979) (Matyas,
1978).
fully distributed key control
This type of key management technique permits every "intel
ligent"
node in the network to serve as a KDC at one time or
another. In the situation where there are three participants,
A,, A9, and A3
which reside at nodes N1# N2, and N3, then only
the key distribution centers at each of these nodes need to be
involved in the establishment of a communication channel for
t^is-particularcase^- Of the.Jthrae KDC's, only one^-is-r
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ble for selecting the key used for communication purposes. This
KDC will then transmit the necessary information to the remain
ing two KDC's. Each of these KDC's will, in turn, decide whether
or not to authorize the desired connection. Upon reaching a de
cision, each KDC will transmit its reply to the originating KDC.
If the connection is permitted, the keys will be distributed to
the potential participants.
With this method, only those nodes which are directly in
volved in the communication link (i.e. those nodes which support
the intended participants) need to be properly functioning. As
a result, this is a major advantage for this key management
i
scheme. For this scheme to. function effectively, each KDC must |
be able to communicate with the participants at its own node in ;
a secure fashion. This means that if the user software is
forced to use the network only through those channels which have]
been encrypted, that each host has the authority to enforce its
own security policy. Thus, this method is particularly useful
for decentralized organizations (Popek & Kline, 1979).
hierarchical key control
This technique distributes the key control function among
"local", "global", and
"regional"
controllers. In the case of
the
"local"
controller, he is permitted to communicate only with
those entities which are located in his immediate locale, if
communication is desired with entities that are located outside
of his locale, the
"local"
controller must contact the "regional^
controller for that particular area. Thus each local KDC is
responsible for prearranging channels for the potential partici-|
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pants in his area while regional controllers are responsible
only for secure communications with local controllers.
If all of the participants in a channel are within the same
region, then the connection procedure is the same as for central-
ized key control since only the local controller is involved.
ij
If the participants are not located within the same region then;
ii
i
it is necessary for the appropriate regional controllers to re- Ij
quest permission from the global controller for the construction
of a communication channel.
This technique is quite flexible in that it generalizes to
multiple levels as in the case of a very large network and is
analogous to national telephone exchanges where the exchanges
play a role very similar to the key distribution center. As a
final point, let it be noted that any of the three levels, be
it local, regional, or global, has the ability to select the
keys to be used during communication.
Unlike the previous key management schemes, the failure of
any component of the distributed key control facility results in
only the users local to the failed
component suffering hardship.!
Due to the considerable importance of the regional and global
controllers to the architecture of the network, these two types
j
of controllers are frequently duplicated so that the crash of a
single node will not segment the network.
After briefly describing three types of key management
schemes it can be noted that there are strong similarities a-
mong them. The
differences which do exist between the various
methods can be reduced even further by designing hybrid schemes
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which take on some of the advantages of each. Whereas central
ized key control is a degenerate case of hierarchical control,
fully distributed key control can be viewed as a variant of
hier-j-
archical key control. In the case of fully distributed key con
trol, each host's KDC acts as a local key controller for that
host's entities and communicates with other local key controller^
to establish connections. In this instance, the communication
is direct and a regional controller is not required (Popek &
Kline, 1979).
Public-Key Based Distribution Algorithms
It is believed by many that public-key algorithms may be bet-l
ter suited for key distribution methods than conventional algo
rithms primarily due to their simplicity. Since the key
K'
,
which is used for decipherment, can not be derived from the en
ciphering key K, a user A after obtaining a matched key pair
(K,K'), can publicize his enciphering key K. Thus another
partis
cipant, B, who wishes to send
a message to A can do so by em
ploying the publicly available key K. In order for A to respond
to B's message, A merely employs
B's public key.
Although this technique appears to be much simpler than the
previous means used to establish secure communication channels ,
in actuality, it
is not. Despite the fact that no secure dia
logue is required with the key distribution center as a prelim
inary step in establishing
a channel and the appearance that no j
key distribution problem exists nor that any central authority
'is required to establish the channel, some form of central au-
:thoritX-i^ia4^^=^^^^--^Popfi^ * Kl'ine -3-339) (Nftedham-&-Schroed^
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1978). Thus the protocol involved is no simpler nor any more
efficient than the one based on conventional algorithms.
i In public-key algorithms, the safety of the public-key schem^
iis totally dependent upon the selection of a correct key by the
jsender. Thus, if the key listed in the public directory is in
correct, then the public-key encryption scheme can not adequate
ly protect the data. Furthermore, since the directory listing
the public keys for all of the system users will need to be con
stantly updated, maintenance of the directory will
be time con
suming. This requires a means of carefully maintaining the di
rectory while at the same time ensuring that
all changes have
been carefully authenticated and that the correct public key is
sent out upon request (Popek & Kline, 1979).
To illustrate how public-key algorithms can be
incorporated
in key distribution centers, a modified
version of the previous
example for this section is presented below. In this example,
participants A and B each have a public key which is known only
to the authority and a private key known only to themselves.
The authority also has a
public key which is known to all parti
cipants and a private key known only to the authority (Popek &
Inline 1979) (Needham & Schroeder, 1978).
'
In order to initiate a communication channel with user B , A
sends to the authority a time-stamped
message requesting
communi-}-
ication with B. The authority responds by sending A the public
key of B a copy of
the original request, and the time stamp.
JThis entire transmission is encrypted using the authority's pri-
i
Ivate key. participant ^prj3ge^s_to__dejCiryp
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verify the authenticity of the message. The time stamp guaran
tees that this is not an old message from the authority contain
ing a key other than B's current public key, and the copy of the j
request permits A to verify that the original plaintext message
was not modified in any way (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Nox* that A has knoxcledge of B's public key, communications
i
between the two participants, A and B, can noxi? begin. The first;
step is for A to properly identify himself to B. In order to
do this, A sends his name and an identifier to B. This entire
transmission is encrypted in B's public key. B then repeats the
first two steps described in the paragraph above with the author-c
ity to retrieve A's public key. B then sends to A the identifier
just transmitted along with an additional identifier, both of
which are encrypted xvith A's public key. A can then proceed to
decipher the message and verify that he is communicating with
participant B. A now sends back the new identifier to B so that
B can be sure that he is talking to participant A (see figure
17).
The use of certification has been proposed as one means of
eliminating the need to request the
public key from the central
authority for each communication.
In this scheme, a certificate
is nothing more than a user/public-key
pair plus some additional
information used for certification purposes. Thus, each user's
public key can be transmitted to
him via a certificate. Conse
quently if the user/public-key
is stored as a signed message
from the central authority and the user wishes to communicate
with other users^
it is only necessary for the individual to
62
jsend the certificate to each of the desired participants. This
permits each user to check the validity of the certificate, using
(the certifying information, and the eventual retrieval of the
public-key. As a result, this scheme requires that the central
authority be used only once during the request of the initial
(certificate (Popek & Kline, 1979).
I Although certification initially appears to be the perfect
Solution, drawbacks do exist. Prior to using the certificate, thej
(user must decrypt it in order to verify the authenticity of the
i
signature. This also makes it mandatory for the recipient of
the certificate to have a secure and correct way of storing the
key. Thus, even xvith certificates, an internal authentication
mechanism is required (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Unlike conventional encryption algorithms, public-key system^
t
are not as flexible in permitting the merging of protection pol
icy issues with key distribution. This results in making the
implementation of protection policy checks more difficult. In
conventional systems, if tx^o users are not authorized to communi
cate with one another, the key controller merely refuses to dis
tribute the keys. This is not the case with public-key systems
(where the enciphering keys are public knowledge. As a result,
i
if the addition of a protection check is so desired, modificatior
must be made to the existing system (Popek & Kline, 1979) (Needham
.& Schroeder, 1978). j
;?ublic-Key versus Conventional-Key Distribution for Private
[
Communication
As mentioned previously, the security of the conventional-
63
key distribution scheme is totally dependent upon maintaining
the security of the secret key used for encryption and de
cryption whereas for the public-key distribution method the
safety of the deciphering key is vita]. In both techniques an I
equivalent amount of secure storage is mandatory. Both public- j
key and conventional-key algorithms require approximately the j
same amount of overhead to establish a connection.
'
At first glance it may appear that the software required to
implement the public-key authority would be less complex than j
that needed for the KDC. The simplicity of the softx^are would
make it much easier to certify the correct operation of this
scheme, which in turn would give the public-key method a signi
ficant advantage over the conventional-key method. This is not
the case, however. In spite of the fact that
the contents of thje
authority need not be protected against
unauthorized reference
in public-key encryption since the enciphering keys
are made
public, the keys used in
the authentication protocol between the
KDC and the user must be protected against reference (Popek &
Kline 1979). In reality, the amount of
software needed to en-
I
sure the proper functioning of the authority is not substantially!
different from that required for a secure KDC. If all of the
KDC keys are stored in encrypted form using a KDC master key andj
are decrypted only when needed, the security of the KDC is re
duced to maintaining the secrecy of the master key and of the
individual keys when they are in use (Popek & Kline, 1978) (Po
pek & Kline, 1979).
This situation is identical to the secure
storage and protection
required by the deciphering key during
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its use in the public-key encryption scheme (Popek & Kline, 1979]),
Unlike the public-key method, it is possible for the KDC to
eavesdrop or even generate supposedly valid messages in the con
ventional-key scheme. This is made possible by the fact that th^
KDC is issued a conversation key. This problem can be remedied
through the addition of certified code to the KDC which oversees
the destruction of the conversation keys immediately following
their distribution. This eliminates the minor distinction be
tween the two schemes. Consequently, both the
conventional-
and public-key algorithms are quite similar
- moreso than was
initially expected at first glance (Popek & Kline, 1979) (Hellman^
1979)(Needham & Schroeder, 1978).
Public-Key Cryptosystems
Public-key systems are based on trapdoor one-way functions.
A one-way function is characterized by the fact that it is
in-
vertible and although easy to compute, it is computationally
in-
feasible to solve the equation y = f(x) for almost all x in the
domain of f . This means that given a complete description of
the function f unless certain private information which was
employed in the design of the function is made available, it is
computationally infeasible to compute
the inverse of f,
f~
.
Thus the characteristics of a trapdoor one-way function f and
its inverse
f"1
make it ideally suited to fulfill the require
ments of a matched key pair (for encryption and decryption) as
needed for a public-key cryptosystem (Hellman, 1979) (Lempel ,
1979).
One ^particular class of trapdoor one-way functions on which
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to base public-key cryptosystems is believed to be quite promis
ing in terms of providing strong algorithms. This class is re
ferred to as NP or nondeterministic, polynomial-time problems
and
is characterized by the fact that as the size of n increases,
Sthe number of computational steps required to solve the problem
increases in proportion to an exponential function of n (i.e. 2 ')
jin contrast to the number of steps required to check a possible
solution increasing only in proportion to a polynomial function
of n (i.e. n"). Since the exponential function increases far
more rapidly than the polynomial one, any solution which
requires
i
Exponentially increasing amounts of computer time is impossible
jto implement for even moderate-sized problems. The tyro public-




The Merkle-Hellman scheme is based on the knapsack of subset





a sum C the solution involves determining which of the numbers
add up to C (Lempel, 1979).
Messages in this scheme can be described as binary n-vectors
Thus, M
= (b-, b2, ... , bn) where M
represents the message and
each b. signifies either
a value of 0 or 1. The initial step
in this method is to convert the message into a string of binary
numbers. The
message is then divided into blocks of n bits each
with each block being designated by X
= (xlf x2, ... , xr ) .
Since each key is a trapdoor
knapsack n-vector symbolized by
the_eguat_iqn





integer, the public directory consists of a listing of the order
ed set of n values which comprise each user's key. Not:
that the number of elements in vector A is the same as the number
pf bits per block or the length of vector X (Hellman, 1979).
The next step is to form the dot product C
= AX where A re
presents the enciphering vector A and X designates the message
block. Thus, C = a,x, + a0x0 + ... + ax . The resulting sum'
i i. i z n n
C is the information that is transmitted over the insecure
chan-
Inel. Should the message be intercepted, it is the intruder's
I
task to recover not only X from result C, but A as well. The
recipient of the transmission is confronted with the same task
|as the intruder, hox^ever, his task is simplified since he has
additional information concerning the design of the function and
knowledge of the deciphering key (Lempel, 1979) (Hellman, 1979).
As an illustration of how the knapsack problem xrorks, the steps
which comprise this NP problem x^ill be described in detail belowl
Please refer to figure 18 for further information on this example
! Suppose that the follox^ing message is to be encoded: "MERGER
I
'SET'. In order to transform this message into a binary string,
la 5-bit binary alphabet is used for this example. Thus, 5 bits
j
are allocated for each letter as
illustrated belox*.
ABCDEFGHI
i 10110 01010 10111 01101
01001 01011 11011 11010 00101
jKLMNOPQR
10101 11110 00011
OHIO 11000 11100 10011 00001 10001
q T u V
W X Y Z
11111 10100 00100
10000 11001 00110 11101 00000
By substituting
the proper 5-bit value for the specific
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letter, the message is transformed into the following binary j
string:
MERGERSET
OHIO 01001 10001 11011 01001 10001 11111 01001 10100
Upon consulting the public directory listing the various
users'
]
enciphering keys, suppose that the intended receiver's encipher-;
ing key is represented by the vector defined as A = (2292, 1089 ,[j
211, 1625, 1283, 599, 759, 315, 2597, 2463). Thus a
= 2291. j|
a~ = 1089, a3
= 211, and so on. Since there are ten elements jj
comprising vector A, n = 10. Therefore, the first block of in- j!
formation, which consists of the first n bits of the binary
plaintext, is equivalent to X, = OHIO 01001, the second block
is designated as X2
= 10001 11011, and so on with the final
block X5
= 10100 00000. (Note that only five bits remain to
fill the last block. Zeroes are used to round out the remainingjj
five bits) . j,
Encipherment of the data proceeds according to the equation jl
il
C = a, x, + a~x0 + ... + ax. This results in C,
= (2292 x 0) -h
1 1 Z Z n n (
(1089 x 1) + (211 x 1) + (1625 x 1) + (1283 x 0) + (599 x 0) + I
(759 x 1) + (315 x 0) '+ (2597 x 0) + (2463 x 1) = C1
= 6147.
Proceeding in a similar fashion for the remaining blocks of data,
C?
= 1089 + 1283 + 599 + 759 + 2597 + 2463 = 9993; C3
= 1089 +
1283 + 599 + 2463 = 5434; C4
= 2292 + 1089 + 211 + 1625 + 1283 ^j
. i
759 + 2463 = 9722; and Cg
= 2292 + 211 = 2503. Thus encipher- !j
ment of the plaintext message "Merger
Set"
produces the numerical
string 6147 9993 5434
9722 2503 (Hellman, 1979).
All of the known methods for solving the knapsack problem
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(require adding up all of the 2 possible subsets of the a^
s to
(determine which subset yields sum C. As the number of elements
in increases, the computational difficulty of solving this
prob
lem also increases. For this reason, the knapsack problem
is
classified as belonging to the class of NP problems (Lempel ,-1979
(Hellman, 1979).
If the elements of vector A are randomly chosen, then the
recovery of X is impossible, even for the receiver of the trans
mission. In this respect, the knapsack problem
appears to be a
one-way function. In order to be able to easily derive X from
C, it is necessary to specifically design vector A so that
the
knowledge of some additional information facilitates the solu
tion of the knapsack problem (Hellman, 1979). However, it must
be noted that not all NP problems lend themselves to the inser
tion of a trapdoor. The knapsack problem does not fall into thijs
category and therefore, a trapdoor can be
designed since there
exist certain vectors for *7hich a solution can be easily calcu





can be disguised so as to appear an an ordinary-looking
vector A in the public file of enciphering keys. Thus, the trap




A' to be disguised as a
complex knapsack problem involving A (Hellman, 1979) (Lempel,
1979).
The creation of such a
trapdoor can be illustrated as follox^
During the
generation of vector A, suppose that








. . . ,
an'
) and each element sl
' is greater
69




+ ... + aj_i
'
If A' = (3, 5, 11, 20, 41, 83, 169, 340, 679, 1358) then a2
'
=
5 is greater than a,' = 3;
a.,'





8. If C = 1563, then C =
A'X'
for some binary vector
X'
=



















The problem of deciphering the ciphertext would be equivalent
to solving a knapsack problem if it were not for the fact
that
the special property of vector
A'
permits the easy solution of
X'. Element
a'
= 1358 xvhich is less than the value 1563 or C
According to the special property of vector
A' the sum of the
nine remaining elements of A',
a1' through ag ,
must be less thaiji
1563 or C. Since this condition holds,
a1Q'
= 1358 is a member




= 1, the equation
C =
A'X'














1358 from both sides of the equation results in the folloxving:











i340x + 679xQ'. The problem is now reduced to determining
8 9






the sum 205. Continuing as before,
ag'
= 679 which is greater
than 205 therefore, this element
is not included as a member
of the subset sum and
xg'
= 0. Element
a8' = 340 which is also





than 205. This means that
a-' is a member of the subset sum.
Consequently,
x_'
=1. This process continues until all values
have been calculated and
X' = (0, 1 , 1, 1^ 0,0, 1, CI, 0 , 1]I.
T
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This represents the original message block X (Hellman, 1979).
The design of a simple knapsack vector A' is relatively easy.
Jrhe difficulty arises when the recipient of the data attempts to
get from vector A' to A and back again. To accomplish this task
[two large random numbers, w and m, are selected. The vector A
lis then generated according to the equation a. = a.'x^ modulo m




A' is equal to the value 20, then a.'w = 15280. Dividing
the value 2731 into 15280 results in the value 5 with a remainder
of 1625. Therefore a. of a.'w modulo m = 1625. Using this
equation, it is possible to derive vector
A' from vector A and
vice versa (Hellman, 1979).
Merkle and Hellman recommend the use of a knapsack vector
whose length n is greater than or equal to 100. For the case
where n = 100, it is suggested that the value for m be chosen
201 202
uniformly from the integers between
2 +1 and 2 - 1. The






where i = 1, 2, ... , n
(Hellman, 1979).
i There is some hesitation to accept the MH scheme as a secure
algorithm solely on the basis of its membership within the class
of NP complete problems. Eligibility for membership in the NP
Complete class is determined on a worst-case basis. Since it is
not clear how difficult a worst-case
sample of an NP-complete
problem is it has been argued that this scheme may not be as
strong an
algorithm as some believe it to be (Hellman, 1979)
(Lempel, 1979).
71
In conclusion, it can be seen that modular
arithmetic plays
a vital role in the generation of public-key cryptosystems,
pri
marily because this type of arithmetic can turn
a continuous
function into a discontinuous one. This permits the introduction
of a great deal of confusion into the calculation of the inverse
functions. Thus, the introduction of modularity into
the genera-j-
tion of the knapsack vector A prevents the recovery of the vec
tor
A' for anyone not possessing knoxvledge of tiie
private trans
formation parameters w and m (Hellman, 1979).
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Scheme
This scheme is also an NP problem. It is based on the
pro-
j
blem of discovering all prime numbers which evenly
divide a very
large number. Each user is responsible for randomly selecting ;
two large random prime numbers p and q along
with a pair of pos
itive integers E and D, respectively. A
value n is obtained by
taking the product of p
and q. This value n and the positive
integer E are then placed in the public
file as the user's en
ciphering key. Thus, the
encryption key consists of the pair
(n E) while the corresponding
decryption key is defined as (n,D)|
In the case of the




cryptograms in the RSA scheme are repre
sented as integers in the
range 0 and n-1. After the message
has been converted into
a string of numbers, the sender
then-
proceeds to divide the string
into blocks Px, P2, ... , Pp_ x*here
each P. is an integer
value between 0 and n-1. The receiver's
public key (nrE) is
located in the directory and the sender
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= 5, q = 11, and E = 3, the enciphering
key for this particular example is (3, 55). If the value of





= 2 =8 modulo 55 (Lempel, 1979 ) (Hellman, 1979). I
The strength of the RSA algorithm is based upon the compu- j
j
tational infeasibility of factoring the product of two large
prime numbers. In order to decipher the ciphertext message, the
receiver must employ n and a secret deciphering key D which is
derived from the prime factors p and q (Lempel, 1979).
Euler's tolient function, which can be expressed as 0(n) =
(p-l)(q-l) when n = pq, plays an important role in understanding
the principle behind the derivation of the deciphering key. All
the functions within the RSA system are calculated modulo n with
the sole exception of the exponent which is determined by modu
lo JZf(n) (Lempel, 1979).
The arithmetic properties of Euler's tolient function alx-jay^
guarantees that a multiplicative inverse D of E modulo 0(n) ex
ists. Thus, ED modulo (p-D(q-l) is equal to the value 1. It i?
this inverse D which is the secret deciphering key for the RSA
scheme. To decipher a ciphertext message, C . modulo n is
com-
puted for each ciphertext number C.. Since C.
= P. modulo n,
C. modulo n is equivalent to (Pi )
=
Pi modulo n. since
the exponent is calculated by modulo 0(n) and ED modulo 0(n) =1
P.ED
modulo n equals P. ,
or simply P.. This illustrates the
i i
transformation of ciphertext into plaintext by raising the ci
phertext to the Dth power and reducing modulo n (Hellman, 1979).
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Modularity plays a dual role in this scheme. It not only
thwarts the recovery of the secret deciphering key D from the
(public enciphering key (E,n) but it also is responsible for pre
venting a direct recovery of the plaintext from the ciphertext.
The difficulty with which D can be computed from the enciphering
jkey (E,n) is determined by the difficulty of factoring n into p
and q. To ensure that no one but the intended receiver x^ill be
able to recover the plaintext message from the ciphertext, it is
recommended that p and q be chosen such that n is approximately
200 digits long (Hellman, 1979) (Lempel, 1979).
As an illustration of the RSA scheme suppose that the fol-
loxving data is available: p = 47-, q = 59 , D = 157, and E
= 17 .
Since 0(n) = (p-D(q-l), 0(n) = (46)f58)
= 2668 while n = pq =
(47) (59) or 2773. The message to be enciphered is "MERGER
SET"
and the transformation of the plaintext message into a string of
numbers proceeds according to the following substitution.
Jrf( ABCDEFGHIJKLM
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
NOP QRSTUVWX. YZ
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
[The plaintext message "MERGER
SET" is converted into the numeri
cal string listed beloxv.
MERGER SET plaintext
I 13 05 18 07 05 18 19 05 20 numerical conversicj^i
;The numerical string
is then broken into blocks of equal length
lp p So that each P . is less than the value of n. If
1 ' 2 '
' x
each block is four digits
in length, then the maximum value of
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P^
is 2626 (i.e the numerical representation of the letters ZZ)
(Since 2626 is less than the value of n which is equal to 2773,





= 0019, and finally, Pg
=
0520. To encipher the first block P. is raised to the Eth powe^i
i'
E 17
and then reduced modulo n. Therefore, C, = P, modulo n = 1305 ]
'ii i
i
jmodulo 2773. The same procedure is followed for the remaining
blocks P2 through P5. The resulting values obtained for C-^
through C,- represent the ciphertext for this particular message
Recovery of the original plaintext message is easily accomplished
by raising each ciphertext block to the power D = 157 modulo
2773 (see figure 19 for further details concerning this example)
(Hellman, 1979) (Lempel, 1979) ( Simmons, 1979).
Whereas the MH scheme did not possess a straightforward
digital signature feature, the RSA system permits direct genera
tion of a digital signature. The RSA public-key cryptosystem
(allows the sender to generate his unique signature Si
=
Pi
jbodulo n for each P.. Note that the use of the user's secret
deciphering key plays an important role in the creation of the
digital signature. After all of the signatures S , S2, ... ,
IS have been calculated, each signed
message block (P., S.) is
n x
then enciphered by the sender using the public enciphering key
of the receiver. This step ensures the privacy of the communi
cation (Lempel, 1979) ( Simmons, 1979).
ii Upon receipt of the ciphertext, the receiver recovers the
j signed message
block (P, S) using his secret key D. He then
i looks up the sender's public key (E,n) and computes Sj^ modulo n
h
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for each i. The order of application of D and E is unimportant.
-
Since D and E are inverse operations and S- = P modulo n, then i
S. modulo n = p.. This guarantees that the message is authentiq
and guards against repudiation of authorship. The digital
sig-
j
nature is dependent upon both the sender and the message being
i
transmitted and thereby ensures that neither the receiver nor
a ;
third party can modify the message without destroying the
valid-
;
ity of the signature (Hellman, 1979) (Rivest, et. al . , 1978) j
(Lempel, 1979).
User Authentication
Within every network there must exist
some means bv which
user authentication is guaranteed. This authentication
mechansinji
guarantees that the would-be user is in fact the individual he
claims to be. At the present time, the most frequently
employed
means of establishing user
authentication is to issue a unique
and secret password to each user of the system.
This technique
reguires the maintainance of a hidden Passxvord Table
which is
nothing more
than a listing of each system user and his
corre
sponding
password. Only the authentication program is
permitted
access to this table. Since the
system accepts the individual
as an authentic user if and only
if he is able to present the
proper password,
it is vital that the security of the passwords
be maintained (Purdy, 1974). Therefore,
it is the duty of the
operating system
to ensure that all system users, with the ex
ception of the System Administrator,
are prohibited access to
the passx^ord Table
(Evans & Kantrowitz, 1974).
Thprs are several__dis.advantages to_.hjis_.s^hemeJ, JiQMejyex
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The major drawback is the dependence upon the entire access con
trol mechanism for the security of the system. Thus, the success
of this scheme is dependent upon the correct operation of a very
large part of the operating system. Another drawback is that
anyone who can obtain physical access to the computer, may be
able to obtain a listing of the Password Table. Any listing of
the table, even if it is obtained for a valid purpose, may be
inadvertently seen by an unauthorized individual. Finally, in
order to implement this authentication scheme xvithin a network,
safeguards must already exist x<?hich protect against the unauthorT
ized reading of files (Purdy, 1974).
A proposed scheme which permits authentication without com
promising security is outlined below. As in the previous method^
the potential user of the system requests access to the system
by pi-esenting his name and secret password P. The validation
program applies some function H to the given password. This re
sults in the value of function H being computed at some point P
or H(P). This computation is then follox-/ed by a look-up opera
tion in the password Table for the entry E xvhich corresponds to
the individual's name. If a match exists between E and H(P) ,
then the individual is accepted as an authorized user of the
system and the user is said to be authenticated (Purdy, 19 74).
This authentication process is based on the assumption
that only the
individual issued the password P knows the value
of P that gives rise to the tabulated E. Thus, this scheme is
based on using a function H
x^hich the would-be-intruder is un
able to invert. Even if the intruder has knowledge of function
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H and has access to the Passx^ord Table, he is still unable to
penetrate the system unless he can invert H to determine the in
put value which produces the desired result. The use of a func
tion H of this type makes it necessary to use an approach other
than mere brute force to penetrate this scheme (Purdy, 1974)
(Evans & Kantrowitz, 1974).
There are txro possible xvays in x-zhich the function H may be
chosen. One approach is to select a function H which is very
hard to invert mathematically. The validity of this scheme is
dependent upon mathematical analysis. The alternative approach
is to select a function that is computationally hard to invert.
This scheme can not be analyzed mathematically nor can the func
tion be analyzed. The subsequent paragraphs describe an authen
tication scheme which employs a function that is computationally
hard to invert (Purdy, 1974).
An extremely large family of functions is a
prerequisite
for this scheme. The password determines x^hich of
these func
tions F will be chosen. This results in F being dependent ;
p P i
upon password P in an extremely complex manner (Purdy, 19 74). I
The computation of the function H is
performed in J cycles
with each cycle having as input a value derived
from the pre
vious cycle. The first
cycle uses the original password P to
generate a new input value for
the second cycle. In this man
ner each cycle
converts a value from the password space into a
new value. This
process continues J times with the final cycle
producing the





In this scheme, x designates the input value or parameter
for each cycle x-zhile F denotes the function calculated by the
cycle. The parameter for each successive cycle is derived by
applying the function NEXT X to the parameter of the previous
cycle. As a result of each cycle employing a different input
value, each cycle is computationally unique (Purdy, 1974).
To further ensure the security of this scheme, each cycle,
in turn, is composed of successive applications of K scrambling
functions f, . Each scrambling function replaces the current
value by a new one and is parametrized by x, the input value for
a particular cycle, and/or by the original password P. Further
more, each scrambling function is repeated m times, x^here m is
determined both by the current x and P (Evans & Kantrowitz, 1974)
(Please see figure 20 for further details on this scheme).
This scheme is particularly desirable primarily because it
is extremely difficult for any intruder to penetrate the system.
Given that the table entry is E, g was the last scrambling func
tion that x^as used, Q was the parameter for g, and that g was
executed m times, then E = g (Q). Even if the intruder has
knowledge of E,g, and , which is the inverse function of g,
he still lacks any knowledge of m. Since m is dependent on the
original password P and is independent of Q and E, the intruder
can not gain any further insight to the problem. Successive
application of the inverse function to E sheds no light on
the situation. The resulting values are of absolutely no help
to the intruder. Even if the intruder x<?as fortunate enough to
obtain Q he probably would not recognize it. Consequently,
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there is no easy manner in which one can go backward from E to
the original passxvord p. The problem becomes increasingly more
difficult as both the number of different scrambling functions
f. and cycles increases (Purdy, 1974).
Various possibilities exist for the possible families of
functions which comprise the scrambling functions f, . This
paper will consider the implementation of a polynomial over a
prime modulus for fn .
Given n. a-,. a~ . ... , a are integers, then the polynomial
p(x) can be defined by the following equation:
p(x) = x + a,x
"
+ ... -<- a -,x + an
If the value of x is greater than or equal to 1 and less than or
equal to P, x^here P represents a large prime number,
then the
function f(x) represents a unique number. Thus f(x)
= p(x)(mod
P) for all values f(x) which are greater than or
equal to 1 and
less than or equal to P. Note that
'='
symbolizes congruence.
This means that f(x) - p(x) is exactly divisible by P. The
function f(x) is said to be congruent p(x) modulo P- Given
the
value of f(x) is 63, p(x)
= 1, and P
= 31, then 63 S 1 (mod 31).
Since 63 - 1 is exactly divisible by 31, f(x) is congruent p(x)
modulo P (Purdy, 1974).
The degree of degeneracy of f(x) at no
time exceeds the
degree n of the polynomial p(x).
This is a very desirable
characteristic of the function f(x). As an
illustration of
this property suppose
the f(x) = Y for all values of i greater
than or equal to 1 and









+ ... + a ,x -f a - Y = 0 (mod p) , d
solutions exist (as determined by x.). If p is a prime number
then no more than n solutions are possible. This is related
to the fact that polynomials of degree n can not have more than
n roots (for real numbers only).
As a result of polynomial root-finding modulo P being an
active research area, it is necessary that some precautions be
I
taken to maintain the security of the scheme. Currently, all
of the algorithms devised to determine the root of a polynomial
2 2
modulo P require at least en (log P) operations where c is
greater than or equal to 1 and the polynomial is of degree n.
To ensure the security of the password scheme relying upon a
polynomial to a prime modulus, it is necessary to choose an
astronomically large degree n xvhile at the same time avoiding
special forms of polynomials (such as polynomials in x
v
where
K is greater than 1). The selection of a large value for n
may result in the computation
time for f(x) increasing. By








b x11^ + a, , . x*here n > n, ^ n0 =? . . .
- n. 9= 1, the computation time
k k+1
' i z k.
for f(x) can be substantially reduced (Purdy, 1974).
Given x, f (x) can be
calculated by a sequence of operations
consisting of the
multiplication of two numbers (i.e. U and V),
the addition of two numbers, or reduction
modulo P.
If the prime P is of the form
2-
-
a, then the types of




reduction modulo P can be effectively
combined by observing
that (U = 2qV)(Y + 2qZ)
= UY +
(2q
- a)(VY + UZ) + a(VY + UZ) +
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(2q
- + a)VZ + a VZ = UY + a(VY + UZ) + a VZ. Added bene
fits result if q is related to the x^ord size of the computer.
In general, fewer than ck log n operations will be required if
the size of constant c is small. This is based on the assumption
that the powers of x are computed by the binary method (Knuth,
2
1969). Since multiplication usually requires c log P basic
machine operations, the total computation time required is
c'k log n log2 P. The value of
c' is dependent upon the type
of computer being used. The computation time can easily be re
duced while at the same time the time required to penetrate
2 2










(mod P), where P
=
264






and a^ are randomly selected
19 digit numbers, illustrates a
polynomial to a prime modulus xtfhich has been tested on an IBM
360/75 and a PDP-10.
If the number of assigned passwords is 1000, then the
likelihood of cracking the system by trial and error is
relative!
3
ly small. It has been
estimated that approximately 10 attempts
must be made before the system can be compromised. The threat
of compromise by a polynomial root-finding modulo P algorithm
is also very small.
The number of operations required to crack
o 7 1 A. ? 16
the scheme is n (log p)z^10"^(19 log
10p>10 . if it can j
be assumed that a machine
operates at the speed of 10 opera- j
tions per second,
then 10 seconds or 400 years x^ould be needed!
i




Although used primarily for communications purposes, encryp
tion techniques are also applicable to data stored on removable
Dr fixed media. Unlike communications applications where the
keys are changed frequently, file encryption requires the en
ciphering key to be maintained for as long as the data is con
sidered to be sensitive. This requires the addition of extra
security measures which will guarantee that the keys are being
properly protected (Sykes, 1976). Other distinctions between
encryption techniques used for stored data and private communi-
pations are outlined below.
1. Only a single copy of the key is needed for file en
cryption. Encryption techniques xtfhen applied to pri
vate communications require as many keys as there are
participants.
2. Relatively short keys must be used for file encryption
since more time is needed to encipher and decipher the
data. Archival files of previously used keys may have
to be maintained.
3. Special control characters do not present a problem
like they did xtfith data transmission.
4. Data that is being transmitted over a channel may not
be modified at any time during transit. File encryp
tion, on the other hand, permits the updating of files
at any time (Walker & Blake, 1977).
Media or file encryption is primarily used to guard against
physical theft of the data as x^ell as ensuring that authorized
users x-zill be allox^ed access to only those files they are pri-
viledged to see. Access protection beloxv the file level can
also be implemented by enciphering those fields of the record
which are confidential. This technique guarantees that only
auth"*"* *gdMifiprs wilI_^^_..abl^-J:P--Ve^L_the,-SejnsJ.tvj5. areas J_Syk_es
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1976) (walker & Blake, 1977).
protection of removable media
Essentially there are three x-/ays of providing protection
for removable media. Encryption devices may be installed in
each tape or disk drive, in the peripheral control units, or
in
the input/output controller (see figures 21a, 21b, and 21c).
Placing the encryption devices in the peripheral control
units
may be far superior to installing these devices in each drive
since fewer encryption devices are required. A substantially
large number of encryption devices are required when they are
placed in the disk and tape drives (Keys & Clamons, 1974).
When the encryption devices are placed in the peripheral
control unit, this control
unit is responsible for setting,
enabling, and/or disabling
the corresponding encryption device.
Since transfers in the peripheral control unit are tagged as
data or control, only
data which is to be recorded by a periph
eral device is enciphered. All control
and status information-
is ignored. This is in direct contrast to
the sitation where
each drive has its own
encryption device. In this scheme every
thing contained on
the tape or disk is enciphered, in figure
21b the peripheral control unit does
not encipher the record
identifier and key fields found on magnetic
disks since this
information must be interpreted by the control unit during
search operations
(Keys & clamons, 1974).
Placing the
encryption device in the input/output control
ler may be even
less desirable since this results in the encryp
tion device being more difficult to use. Enabling
and disabling
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the encryption device is nox* dependent upon whether control, j
status, or data is transmitted as well as which peripheral is j
receiving. Transfers for unit record devices (i.e. line printer j
card reader, console, etc.) should not be encrypted (Keys &
Clamons, 1974).
encryption for internal processing
Unlike the aforementioned methods which provide protection
against physical theft of the tape or disk, the techniques de
scribed in this section prevent unauthorized attempts to read
the tape or disk. Protection is guaranteed by a software-load
able key which is stored in a portion of the software system.
This section can be accessed only by authorized users (see fig
ure 22a) (Keys & Clamons, 1974) (Bartek, 1974).
Initially a user requests access to a specified data seg
ment. This request passes through the access control checks and
is either accepted or rejected, if access is granted, the key
is obtained from a key list along with a pointer to the desired
data segment. The key is transmitted to a decoder/encoder
mechanism which deciphers the data, performs the proper arith-
i
metic operation, and then enciphers the information and once
;
again places it back into the file. , One advantage of this
j
scheme is that it can be easily modified to permit sharing among!
various users of the system. The individual wishing to share
a portion of his file merely encrypts that portion under a dif- :
ferent key. The key is then distributed to all users authorized
to access that portion of the file. Thus through double en- \
cipherment certain portions of the file are accessible only by
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jindividuals who possess the double key (see figure 22b) (Bartek,
i
1974).
j This method's security is dependent upon the correct opera-
i
j
ting system routine obtaining the key. If the key is compromised
through hardware errors or covert means, then the scheme fails.
The intruder is then able to decipher the encrypted information.
One means of eliminating this problem is to permit the user to
supply a portion of the key whenever he logs-on to the system."
Thus even if the intruder has knowledge of the encrypted file !
and the key through breach of access control, he is still unable j
j
to recover the plaintext data (Bartek, 1974).
A variation of this scheme would require a different key I
to be used each time a user logs-on. This
"one-time"
key would
enhance the security benefits of this scheme while at the same
time requiring additional hardware to be installed. The hard
ware would be responsible for re-enciphering the file according
to the nex* key
after"
the arithmetic operation is performed ( see
figure 22c) (Keys & Clamons, 1974) (Bartek, 1974).
Data stored x-.'ithin the system must be able to be easily
updated. Re-encipherment of the entire file must not be neces
sary each time
a change is made to the file. This implies the
i
use of a cipher technique which facilitates the updating of |
selected portions of any file. A partial solution for this prob-i
jlent is the selection of a nexv starting key for each 1000-word j
I
block or page. This method not only significantly reduces the
amount of re-enciphering needed for any changes to the file but
also permits a simple normal
iterative encrypting algorithm to
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be employed (see figure 2 2d) . Any updating that does occur would
require only a single page to be re-enciphered (Bartek, 1974).
data encryption in the main store
Encryption of data in the main store can be carried out by
installing an encryption device betx^een the CPU and the main
store (see figure 23). The handling of control information for
the I/O devices and the data for the printer can be done in any
of the folloxving ways.
1. The channel programs and data can be stored in encrypted
form in the main store. The softx^are needed for this
approach may be more complex as a result of the program
being responsible for turning the encryption device on
and off as needed. The CPU must also be able to distin
guish betx^een data destined for the printer and data
destined for tape, to be printed at a later time.
2. The encryption devices can be installed within the I/O
controllers. These devices are responsible for decoding
the channel programs and data when needed ( see figure
23b).
3. The encryption device may be placed in the main store
unit. This permits the keys and control information to
be transmitted at the same time that the addresses are
sent (see figure 23c).
Placement of the encryption device betx^een the CPU and
storage (as in figure 23a) presents some difficulties since it
may be difficult to control the encryption device. This scheme
restricts the encryption device to operating solely on small
fields. This in turn, limits the type of encryption algorithm
that can be used. Since it is characteristic of the CPU to make
one storage request after another using different keys for each
request,





would be associated with the
instruction counter and address register. Whenever the corre-
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sponding address registers are changed the appropriate keys would
be loaded and unloaded. Such a mechanism could also be installed
in the I/O controller (Keys & Clamons, 1974).
The use of encryption techniques within the main store has
i
several advantages. In paging systems information is frequently
transferred between the main store and the secondary store. Con
sequently, if encryption is used to protect the data in the main
store, these systems x<?ill not find it necessary to encrypt or
decrypt the data on each transfer. The paging mechanism will
no longer be required to keep track of the keys. Another added
benefit of this scheme is the simplification of the security
kernel. The tables associating user identification x^ith keys
must still be protected regardless of the use of encryption.
It is also necessary to protect programs that manipulate this
table along with other programs and tables (Bartek, 1974) (Keys
& Clamons, 1974) .
Netxvork Mail
Netx-jork mail essentially consists of short messages x-zhich
are to be transmitted as soon as possible to the recipient.
Unlike private communications, the recipient of the message need
not be present. If the intended receiver is not currently logged
on to the system, then a
system process or daemon is responsible
for storing the
message until it can be delivered to the proper
person. To ensure
the security of the message, it is desirable
for the daemon never to access to
the plaintext message. This
means that the encrypted
message is transmitted to the daemon
which in turn places the encrypted data directly into the
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recipient's mailbox. At log-in time, the receiver may then pro
ceed to decrypt his mail (Popek & Kline, 1979).
The conventional-key algorithm described earlier may also
be used for network mail. The only modification needed is the j
i
deletion of the last txro messages which guarantee that a current;
channel has been obtained. Since the recipient of the message j
may not be present these messages are superfluous. In order to I
send mail to another party, the originator of the message
re- |
quests a key K. The KDC (key distribution center) responds by |
!
sending key K plus a copy of K encrypted with the receiver's j
secret key. This transmission is appended to the encrypted mail!
and sent to the desired receiver. The daemon delivers both the
encrypted message and key to the recipient's mailbox. The re- j
ceiver is thereby able to decrypt the message at his earliest |
convenience (Popek & Kline, 1979).
As with the conventional-key algorithm, the authentication
process may be dropped from the public-key algorithm.
In this
situation, the
originator of the message obtains the receiver's
public key. The message is enciphered and transmitted to the
desired party. The daemon is responsible for delivering the
encrypted mail to the specified individual. Only the recipient
of the message can decipher the information since no one else
knows his secret key (Popek & Kline, 1979).
in both the
conventional- and public-key protocols, a pre
viously
transmitted message may be re-transmitted as current
mail. Since the
authentication steps have been eliminated from
both protocols,
the possibility of an individual receiving
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duplicate mail is quite possible, if this situation is not ac
ceptable, then records must be kept of previous mail. These re
cords will aid in detecting the transmission of previously sent
messages (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Although both protocols guarantee that only the intended
recipient of the mail will be able to recover the original mes
sage, the receiver can never be certain of the identity of the
sender. The use of digital signatures is one means of ensuring
the authorship of the message (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Digital Signatures
Digital signatures may be generated hy either a public-key
or conventional-key algorithm. The paragraphs which follox^ out
line the methods used to produce digital signatures.
With regard to the public-key algorithm, the originator of
the message enciphers the information with his private key. The
data is then transmitted to the desired party. Prior to de
cryption, the recipient of the message requests a copy of the
sender's public key from the central authority. The key is
transmitted to the receiver who then proceeds to recover the
plaintext by using the sender's public key to decipher the in
formation. In this scheme, the central authority is responsible
not only for retrieving
the appropriate public key but also for
securely storing the values of all
the public keys. This in
cludes any public keys which are not currently in use but which
may be needed
should a dispute arise over an old signature (Popek
& Kline, 1979).
Rabin proposes the use of any strong conventional-key
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algorithm to create a digital signature. One of the initial
steps in this scheme involves an explicit agreement between the
two parties prior to the exchange of signed correspondence. If
one wishes to eliminate the need for this explicit contract, it
is possible to include authentication protocols in this scheme
which serve as a central authority. As xvith public-key algo
rithms, an adjudicator is required for all challenges (Rabin,
1978).
Both public-key and conventional-key algorithms as described
above suffer from the problem of repudiation of authorship. Thi
means that the author of the signed message may at any time
dis-
avoxtf his signature merely by making public his secret key. The
result of this action causes all previously signed messages dis
playing that particular signature to be invalid. Since the pri
vate key is knox^n, any individual is capable of creating a mes
sage xvith that individual's signature. Rabin's scheme limits
the amount of damage which can be caused by repudiation of au
thorship via key compromise. Since his scheme employs a dif
ferent key for each message, no one key is ever repeated. In
this manner, even if
a key is compromised only the corresponding
signature is affected. The security of the signatures based on
the other keys is still maintained. This feature need not be
unique to only the conventional-key algorithm. The addition of
a protocol capable of changing the keys for each message would
provide the same benefits to any public-key method as it does
for Rabin's scheme (Rabin, 1978) (Popek & Kline, 1979).
It is apparent that the problem of repudiation exists any
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time private information needed to validate a signature is in
danger of being compromised. Thus, alternate solutions must be
developed which can eliminate this problem. One proposal in
volves the inclusion of a time-stamp. This would prevent the
author of the signature to disavox* earlier signed correspondence
should he later reveal his private key. Such modifications to
both the conventional-key and public-key algorithms are dis
cussed belox*.
a conventional-key approach using network-registry-based
_____^_
signatures
This scheme is based upon the insertion of a trusted inter
pretive layer (i.e. a software and/or hardware "unit") betxveen
the author and his signature keys. All units in the netxvork are
collectively organized to provide digital signature facilities.
The total collection of units is referred to as a distributed
network registry or NR. Communication between the various com
ponents of the registry is made possible through a lox-7-level
link-style encryption protocol. A digital signature may then be
generated as followsi The originator of the signature identified
himself to a local component of the network registry. After
authentication procedures have been carried out the message to
be transmitted is sent to the NR. This transmission includes
the message, a
request for a digital signature, and the name of
the desired recipient of the message. The NR, in turn, computes
a characteristic function of the message, author, recipient, and
current time. The resulting characteristic value is then en
ciphered with a key known only to the NR. This produces a
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"signature block" which is transmitted to the desired recipient.
(The characteristic function operates on the plaintext message,
author, recipient, and current time to produce a characteristic
value. This function is characterized by the fact that given
the plaintext message, the function, and the resulting charac
teristic value, it is extremely difficult to determine another
plaintext message which produces the same characteristic value.
Consequently, this function is very similar to the one-x^ay ciphej^:
functions used to protect passwords.) (Needham & Schroeder,
1978).
This scheme must have adequate safeguards built into the
system x-zhich can ensure the safety of the keys used to encrypt
the signature blocks. The characteristic function which oper
ates on the plaintext message, author, recipient, and current
time should require the compromise of multiple components before
the validity of the signature is affected (Popek & Kline, 1979).
notary-public -based signatures
The use of a public-key algorithm to create digital signa
tures requires the implementation of a number of notary public
mechanisms. Each mechanism must operate independently of all
others. In this scheme, the originator of the message appends
his signature to the data and transmits it to one of the notary
public mechanisms. Here the message is time-stamped and the
entire message plus time-stamp is enciphered a second time.
The second encryption process is the public notary's x^ay of
signing the
"signature block". The resulting block is then re
turned to the originator of the message. He then places the
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necessary plaintext information around the doubly signed
corre- j
I
spondence. The block is noxv ready to be transmitted to the
de- \
sired party (Popek & Kline, 1979) (Popek & Kline, 1978).
Upon receipt of the encrypted message, the receiver
verifies;
the notary's signature. This is accomplished by deciphering the;
block using the notary's public key. The signature block
is
i
then deciphered using the public key of the originator of the
t
message thus permitting recovery of the plaintext
message (Popek
& Kline, 1979).
Repudiation of authorship is prevented in this scheme by ;
having each notary time-stamp his signature. Thus
the origina
tor of the message can not invalidate his signature by publiciz
ing his key. If the notary public
returns a copy of each no
tarized message it processes to the author's
permanent address,
then the possibility of a
forged message being transmitted is
eliminated. This prevents the author
of the signature from
claiming that his key x^as
compromised without his knovrledge and
selective messages forged (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Success of both the network-registry-based scheme
and the
notary-public solution is dependent upon the use of
multiple j
facilities. If only one notary exists,
then this approach is
i
no more secure
than the use of a single NR. Redundant
facili- |
ties reduce the
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signature algorithms, the security of the signatures is
dependenij:
lupon the ability of the tx^o methods to protect the keys in the
I
Ifuture (Popek & Kline, 1979).
i
I The notary-public and network-registry-based signature al
gorithms represent a definite improvement over previous schemes
Unlike earlier protocols, the originator of the
signature can
not repudiate the signature at will. The addition of time-stamp^
prevents this from happening. As a result of these modified
schemes being composed of several components which collectively
provide digital signature facilities, the failure of several of
the components is necessary before a signature becomes invalid.
Earlier protocols resulted in the signature being invalid when
a single failure occurred (Popek & Kline, 1979).
Execution Time Requirements for Encryption Algorithms
Despite the fact that encryption techniques are deemed
valuable for protecting sensitive data, little information has
been gathered concerning the cost in terms of CPU
time required
for the encryption/decryption process. For this reason, Fried
man and Hoffman performed a study dealing xvith execution time
requirements for specific encryption algorithms. The purpose of
their study was to
provide more extensive and replicable data
on the cost of encryption
techniques (Friedman & Hoffman, 1974)
(Walker & Blake, 1977).
in this experiment, the
information to be enciphered was a
portion of text x^hich x-/as
entered in alphabetic form from cards.
The binary
representation of the text x^as then added by means of
modulo tx^o addition
x^ith the corresponding bits of the key.
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The encryption algorithm was coded in both assembly language and
Fortran for purposes of comparison. In order to minimize the
effect of any external influences upon the experiment, the entir^
encryption process was performed in main core memory (Friedman &
Hoffman, 1974).
Using a CDC 6400 computer five different tests xvere perform
ed to measure the CPU time. Initially a test was made to meas
ure the time required to transfer the test data from one loca
tion to another without encipherment. These results were later
used as a base for determining the execution time overhead in
curred by the other four tests. The remaining four tests includ-j-
ed encipherment with a one-xi/ord or constant key ( a 60-bit xvord
was added modulo two to each 60-bit xvord of data)
,
encipherment
iwith a 125-word key (a periodic key 125 words in length was
iadded modulo two to each successive 125 words of data)
,
double
key encipherment (two periodic keys, 125 and 123 words in length,
were added modulo two to the plaintext data) , and encipherment
iusing a pseudo random key (Friedman & Hoffman, 1974).
'
To aid in interpreting the results of this experiment, the
concept of an "enciphering time
coefficient"
x^as introduced.
This coefficient was defined to be the ratio of time required to
encipher the data versus the time needed solely to transfer the
test data from one location to another without encipherment.
Encryption of data with a one-word key in assembly language re
sulted in an enciphering time coefficient of 1.00 - a very small
time penalty. The pseudo-random key cipher, on the other hand,
tur"p-d nut to_be the_woj^_a^sembLy_LangjAage_cj^e_wi.th-_an.
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'enciphering time coefficient of 4.21. This method was four times
islower than the initial test which merely fetched and stored
the
jtest data. The coefficients for the Fortran encryption algorithm
were found to be significantly higher than those for the assembly
i
language routines (see figure 24). Thus the results of this
study indicated that Fortran took approximately four
times as
long as those same techniques written in assembly language.
Not only is more time required to encipher data using a
Fortran
program as compared to an assembly language program, but the
ratio of encipherment time to merely transfer the test data
from
one location to another is significantly greater in Fortran than
in assembly language. The results of this
experiment therefore
indicate that the programming language must be considered to
have a significant effect upon the time and cost of enciphering
techniques (Friedman & Hoffman, 1974) (Walker & Blake, 1977).
Conclusion
The low operational cost of small computers as
compared with
larger centralized ones coupled with a
more advanced technology
dealing with the interconnection
of these small computers has re-j.
'suited in a significant increase in the growth of computer net
works. These networks easily facilitate organizational
growth
!as well as permitting the decentralization of computing resourced
'and information. Both of these factors are highly desirable in
j
meeting
organizational needs (Popek & Kline, 1979).
The security of
such computer netx\'orks is now being question-l
ed since the underlying
hardxvare can not be assumed to be secure,,
Since the
communication channels used by the network are not
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under the physical control of the user, precautions must be taken
to ensure the safe transmission of the data. Care must also be
taken to guarantee that files stored x^ithin the network have not
'
been modified. Only authorized users should have access to those
data segments they are priviledged to access. As a result the j
growth of computer networks has led to concern over the issues o^
privacy, security, and integrity of information exchange (Popek j
i
& Kline, 1979) . |
The government's success in using cryptographic techniques
to protect sensitive data has led commercial and private sectors
to take a closer look at data encryption. As a result encryptiorl.
techniques are being used to transmit and store data over media
which are believed to be insecure. Data encryption techniques
are being applied to communications, removable media, and inter
nal processing. Encryption algorithms are currently taking on a
vital role x^ithin computer networks. A strong encryption algo
rithm that can not be easily compromised is therefore a prereq
uisite to the development of a secure network. The ability to
integrate encryption methods into the operating system and appli-t-
cations softx^are x^hich are part of the netx^ork are other impor
tant areas xrfiich must be considered very carefully (Popek & Klin^
1979).
Encryption techniques may be incorporated x-?ithin the net
work through hardware, firmx^are, or software, if the computer
network is small and only a few communication lines are needed
to transmit data between computers , a separate cryptographic
device cpn_bg




data that is transmitted to and from the user and the computer
will probably be deciphered only upon receipt of the message.
|ln general, the time required to encipher/decipher the message
iat the terminal is faster than that required for transmission
irates. Any encryption/decryption techniques performed at the
i
Iconputer are usually carried out by means of a software program.
Thus the means of implementating the encryption/decryption pro
cess is dependent upon the type of application required (Walker
& Blake, 1977) .
A strong and flexible encryption/decryption
algorithm should
make the intruder's task as difficult as possible. This means
that the time and money required to penetrate the system
should
by far exceed the value of the information being protected.
Given knowledge of the algorithm the intruder should still be
unable to penetrate the system x-zithout possession of the appro
priate key. A flexible key should be used. Thus if a key is
ever compromised, another key can be easily substituted.
The
use of changeable keys also permits each user to employ his own
jseparate code. Simple encryption/decryption techniques should
be used so that excessive hardware
and/or softx^are can be elim
inated. Any transmission errors that
result should not cause
the entire message to be re-transmitted.
Error detection and
correction schemes must be employed which do not interfere with
security measures. Finally,
the encryption/decryption process
must be transparent to the user.
No special operations should b^
reoruired by the user to initiate
the process (Bartek, 1974).
in the past
encryption has been used primarily for data
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communication applications. Cryptographic techniques with regard
to file protection have received little attention primarily be
cause this area is more problematic than communication applica
tions. The principal difficulties encountered with file encryp
tion deal with the maintenance of the cryptographic keys for dif-(-
ferent files. The integrity of the key must be ensured for as
long as the data it is protecting is considered to be sensitive
(Anderson, 1972). Thus file encipherment is effective only where
the integrity of the key can be maintained and where the crypto
graphic technique is itself reasonable complex (Anderson, 1972)
(Walker & Bruce, 1977).
Prior to employing encryption techniques to preserve
the
security of information within the computer, one
must carefully
evaluate the degree of security encryption will provide as well
jas its limitations. Those parts of the computer network which
jare capable of performing encryption and decryption must be de
termined along with the
cost/performance penalty introduced by
icryptographic techniques (Keys & Clamons, 1974).
I File encryption while protecting data from being accessed
i
by unauthorized users does
have its disadvantages. Encryption
does not guarantee that the files are
"write protected". This
means that the danger does exist
that the files may be written
over and thus destroyed. A back-up file
system is still re
quired. Nor is file
encryption able to completely remove the
ipossibility that
the system will be penetrated by a professional
code breaker. The sole
means of eliminating the danger of key
i compromise is to periodically change the keys. This requires
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that all files be copied and re-enciphered using the new keys
(Keys & Clamons, 1974).
The Future of Cryptography
Encryption techniques promise to enhance security measures
within computer netx^orks. A secure environment is possible only
through the inclusion of encryption techniques xvith other secu-
ity measures. Encryption by itself is not sufficient to pro
tect a network (Bartek, 1974).
As a result of the softxvare implementation of enciphering
techniques being relatively low in cost plus the low overhead of
fast hardware devices, data encryption is a highly satisfactory
cost-effective means of providing data security (Bartek, 1974)
(Keys & Clamons, 1974). At the present
time inexpensive high
speed devices x-zhen properly included x^ithin the computer
network
are capable of providing data protection
for tapes and disks.
Encryption in the main store may be feasible xvithin the near
fu-
ture as hardware technology improves. The
development of large
scale integration (LSI) will enable data encryption to occur
within the CPU. The design of
more superior encryption techni
ques and faster, more
inexpensive circuits promises to broaden
the future of
cryptographic techniques (Keys & Clamons, 1974).
As a result of
encryption technology being used primarily
by the government,
the majority of information on this topic is
classified information. The
ultimate success of security archi
tecture using
encryption is dependent upon the xv'illingness of
government
agencies to help develop the algorithms necessary for
commercial
applications (Keys & Clamons, 1974) (Bartek, 1974).
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Fiaure 9: This diagram illustrates the
three major steps
which the Data Encryption Standard incorporates
during the encipherment of a
64 bit data block.
Step 1: The initial permutation, IP,
is actually
a transposition operation. This opera
tion manipulates only the bits that com
prise the 64 bit input block and does not
utilize the 64 bit key.
Step 2: The recirculating
block product encipher
ing process is a complex
key-dependent
product transformation, the major portion
of which consists of 16 iterations of sub
stitution and transposition operations.
Step 3: The
inverse initial permutation, IP"1,
which is the final transposition operation
and is the actual reversal of step 1.
(Katzan 1977)
















diagram of the Data Encryption Standard
*
(Bright & Enison, 1978)
Leftmost 32 bits \ Rightmost 32 bits
input: 32 bits






+ + . . . + +
*
64 bit key







(8 groups of 6 bits)
... ^K selection Functions
I Jli input: 6 bits
j output: 4 bits









Leftmost 32 bits I Rightmost 32 bits
Figure 9c: This
diagram illustrates the steps
involved in one
iteration of the
computations in the product trans
formation of the DES
(recirculating. block product
enciphering
process). Note that the
* denotes
steps in the













48 bit result Kn (48 bits)
Selection j
Functions








K ) - encryption
f(L., K ) - decryption
32 bits
Figure 10: Overview of the cipher function (Katzan, 1977)
The selection operation E takes a 32 bit block as
input and yields a 48 bit result. This result is
then added (modulo-2 addition) to a 48 bit subkey,
K
,
on a bit-by-bit basis yielding a 48 bit result.
Th*is result is in turn converted to 32 bits by means
of a set of selection functions (S1,...,Sg). In the
final step, this 32 bit result undergoes a permuta













This 32 bit block
is composed, of eight
groups of 4 bits each
corresponding to S-, ,
'2' '8
Figure 11: This diagram illustrates the unigue set of selection
functions used in the cipher function.
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7 4 14 2 13 1
14 8 13 () 2 11






































Figure 12: This diagram illustrates the use of the selection
function S, . Input to the function S, is the binary
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C?'= C~w modulo m
a'










Figure 18: This diagram illustrates the flow of information
in the trapdoor knapsack cryptosystem.
The random-number generator is used to select the secret
vector a'. Each element of this vector is characterized
by the fact that it is greater than the sum of the pre
ceding elements.
(continued on next page)
Figure 18 (continued)
After the receiver has selected his secret vector
a*
he also selects two large random numbers w and m.
Neither w nor m must share a common factor. These
two values are the trapdoor parameters and are re
sponsible for transforming the secret and relatively
easy vector
a'
into the more difficult public vec
tor a. This transformation of vector a' into vec
tor a is accomplished by using the equation a]_ =
ai'w modulo m, a2 = 3-2'^ modulo m, and so on. Vec
tor a is then transmitted over an insecure channel
to the sender or is listed in the public directory
as the receiver's public enciphering key.
The first step in enciphering the plaintext message
P is for the sender to convert the message into a
binary string. The sender then refers to the public
directory to look up the receiver's public key. The
number of elements which comprise the receiver's
public key determines the length of each block into
which the binary string will be divided. For example,
if there are 10 elements in the public vector, then
the binary string will be divided into blocks of 10
bits each.
Each block is then enciphered by forming the dot
product with vector a. if x = (x^,X2 , . . . ,xn) re
presents a block of information, then C^
= ax =
alxl + a2x2 + + anxn The ciphertext values
are then transmitted over an insecure channel.
Upon receipt of the ciphertext, the receiver proceeds





modulo m. Since w~l is the
inverse of w modulo m and aj
= al'w modulo m, a2 =
a2vr-l modulo m, etc., then
ai'









+ ... + an'Xnw""l, or
a1w-lx1 + ... + aw-lxn,
modulo m, equals a^x^ + ... +
a_'xn. This merely states that
CI'
equals a'.x. This
then permits the difficult recovery of x from Ci & a to
be transformed into the easy problem of recovering x
from Ci" and a'. Only the receiver, who has knowledge
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SET
OHIO 01001 10001 11011 01001 10001 11111 01001 10100
A=( 2292, 1089, 211, 1625, 1283,
599. 759 f 315 2597.2463)
2292=3 x 764 mod 2731
1089=5 x 764 mod 2731
































(S147 x 1605) modulo 2731 = 1563
(9993 x 1605) modulo 2731 = 2333
(5434 x 1605) modulo 2731 = 1487
(9722 x 16051 modulo 2731 = 1607












Figure 18 (Continued): Schematic illustration of the trapdoor
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x-# NEXT X (x)
T
answer is in V
I
EXIT
Figure 20: This diagram illustrates a user authentication scheme
which does not require secrecy in the computer. The
overall transformation is described by the flowchart
outlined above.
The variables used in the diagram are described on
the following page.
V The current value to be scrambled. Each application of a
scrambling function f^ replaces V by a new value.
The number of times a particular scrambling function f, is
to be repeated.
m
k A counter used to designate K unique scrambling functions.
NEXT X ; A function which when applied to the parameter of the pre
vious cycle results in the parameter for the next subsequent
cycle.
P The original password entered by the user.
q, A function which is applied to P and the current value of x
to determine the number of times to iterate the current f, .
flr The scrambling functions.
K The number of distinct scrambling functions.
j The number of cycles.
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